2002 Ron Paul 47:1
Mr. Speaker, HR 3717, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Reform
Act, expands the federal government’s unconstitutional control over the
financial services industry and raises taxes on all financial
institutions.
Furthermore, this legislation could increase the possibility of future
bank
failures. Therefore, I must oppose this bill.
2002 Ron Paul 47:2
I primarily object to the provisions in HR 3717 which
may
increase the premiums assessed on participating financial institutions.
These
"premiums," which are actually taxes, are the premier sources of funds
for the Deposit Insurance Fund. This fund is used to bail out banks who
experience difficulties meeting their commitments to their depositors.
Thus, the
deposit insurance system transfers liability for poor management
decisions from
those who made the decisions to their competitors. This system punishes
those
financial institutions which follow sound practices, as they are forced
to
absorb the losses of their competitors. This also compounds the moral
hazard
problem created whenever government socializes business losses.
2002 Ron Paul 47:3
In the event of a severe banking crisis, Congress
likely will
transfer funds from general revenues into the Deposit Insurance Fund,
which
could make all taxpayers liable for the mistakes of a few. Of course,
such a
bailout would require separate authorization from Congress, but can
anyone
imagine Congress saying "No" to banking lobbyists pleading for relief
from the costs of bailing out their weaker competitors?
2002 Ron Paul 47:4
Government subsidies lead to government control, as
regulations are imposed on the recipients of the subsidies in order to
address
the moral hazard problem. This is certainly the case in banking, which
is one of
the most heavily regulated industries in America. However, as George
Kaufman,
the John Smith Professor of Banking and Finance at Loyola University in
Chicago,
and co-chair of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, pointed out
in a
study for the CATO Institute, the FDIC’s history of poor management
exacerbated the banking crisis of the eighties and nineties. Professor
Kaufman
properly identifies a key reason for the FDIC’s poor track record in
protecting individual depositors: regulators have incentives to
downplay or even
cover-up problems in the financial system such as banking failures.
Banking
failures are black marks on the regulators’ records. In addition,
regulators
may be subject to political pressure to delay imposing sanctions on
failing
institutions, thus increasing the magnitude of the loss.
2002 Ron Paul 47:5
Immediately after a problem in the banking industry
comes to
light, the media and Congress inevitably will blame it on regulators
who were
"asleep at the switch." Yet, most politicians continue to believe the
very regulators whose incompetence (or worse) either caused or
contributed to
the problem will somehow prevent future crises!
2002 Ron Paul 47:6
The presence of deposit insurance and government
regulations
removes incentives for individuals to act on their own to protect their
deposits
or even inquire as to the health of their financial institutions. After
all, why
should individuals be concerned with the health of their financial
institutions
when the federal government insures their deposits?
2002 Ron Paul 47:7
Finally, I would remind my colleagues that the
federal deposit
insurance program lacks constitutional authority. Congress’ only
mandate in
the area of money and banking is to maintain the value of the money.
Unfortunately, Congress abdicated its responsibility over monetary
policy with
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which allows the
federal
government to erode the value of the currency at the will of the
central bank.
Congress’ embrace of fiat money is directly responsible for the
instability in
the banking system that created the justification for deposit insurance.
2002 Ron Paul 47:8
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, HR 3717 imposes new taxes
on
financial institutions, forces sound institutions to pay for the
mistakes of
their reckless competitors, increases the chances of taxpayers being
forced to
bail out unsound financial institutions, reduces individual depositors’
incentives to take action to protect their deposits, and exceeds
Congress’s
constitutional authority. I therefore urge my colleagues to reject this
bill.
Instead of extending this federal program, Congress should work to
prevent the
crises which justify government programs like deposit insurance, by
fulfilling
our constitutional responsibility to pursue sound monetary policies.
This chapter appeared in Ron Pauls Congressional website at http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2002/cr052202b.htm