

Price (NC)	Schiff	Tonko
Quigley	Schrader	Towns
Rahall	Schwartz	Tsongas
Rangel	Scott (VA)	Van Hollen
Reyes	Scott, David	Velázquez
Richardson	Serrano	Visclosky
Richmond	Sewell	Walz (MN)
Ross (AR)	Sherman	Wasserman
Rothman (NJ)	Shuler	Waters
Roybal-Allard	Sires	Watt
Ruppersberger	Slaughter	Waxman
Rush	Smith (WA)	Welch
Ryan (OH)	Speier	Wilson (FL)
Sánchez, Linda	Stark	Woolsey
T.	Sutton	Yarmuth
Sanchez, Loretta	Thompson (CA)	
Sarbanes	Thompson (MS)	
Schakowsky	Tierney	

NOT VOTING—6

Akin	Dingell	Jackson (IL)
Cardoza	Gutierrez	McKinley

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes remaining.

□ 1420

So the resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Ms. Curtis, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has agreed to a concurrent resolution of the following title in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. Con. Res. 55. Concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R. 1627.

CORRECTING THE ENROLLMENT OF H.R. 1627

Mr. MILLER of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 55) directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R. 1627, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

S. CON. RES. 55

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring). That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 1627) an Act to amend title 38, United States Code, to furnish hospital care and medical services to veterans who were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, while the water was contaminated at Camp Lejeune, to improve the provision of housing assistance to veterans and their families, and for other purposes, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall make the following correction: in section 201, strike "Andrew Connelly" and insert "Andrew Connolly".

The concurrent resolution was concurred in.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PRESENTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL TO DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on House Administration be discharged from further consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 135) authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol for the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in recognition of her leadership and perseverance in the struggle for freedom and democracy in Burma, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 135

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring).

SECTION 1. USE OF ROTUNDA FOR PRESENTATION OF CONGRESSIONAL GOLD MEDAL TO DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI.

The rotunda of the Capitol is authorized to be used on September 19, 2012, for the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in recognition of her leadership and perseverance in the struggle for freedom and democracy in Burma. Physical preparations for the ceremony shall be carried out in accordance with such conditions as the Architect of the Capitol may prescribe.

The concurrent resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

HOUR OF MEETING ON TOMORROW

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to

the resolution (H. Res. 750) providing for the concurrence by the House in the Senate amendment to H.R. 1905, with an amendment.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. RES. 750

Resolved. That upon the adoption of this resolution the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled "An Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes.", with the Senate amendment thereto, shall be considered to have been taken from the Speaker's table to the end that the Senate amendment thereto be, and the same is hereby, agreed to with the following amendment:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment of the Senate, insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This Act may be cited as the "Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012".

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on enforcement of multilateral sanctions regime and expansion and implementation of sanctions laws.

Sec. 102. Diplomatic efforts to expand multilateral sanctions regime.

TITLE II—EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN

Subtitle A—Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to the energy sector of Iran.

Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transportation of crude oil from Iran and evasion of sanctions by shipping companies.

Sec. 203. Expansion of sanctions with respect to development by Iran of weapons of mass destruction.

Sec. 204. Expansion of sanctions available under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Sec. 205. Modification of waiver standard under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Sec. 206. Briefings on implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Sec. 207. Expansion of definitions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on energy sector of Iran.

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

Sec. 211. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the provision of vessels or shipping services to transport certain goods related to proliferation or terrorism activities to Iran.

Sec. 212. Imposition of sanctions with respect to provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian Tanker Company.

Sec. 213. Imposition of sanctions with respect to purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.

- Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to subsidiaries and agents of persons sanctioned by United Nations Security Council resolutions.
- Sec. 215. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions with persons sanctioned for certain activities relating to terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Sec. 216. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain activities relating to Iran.
- Sec. 217. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and sanctions evaders.
- Sec. 218. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign subsidiaries.
- Sec. 219. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to sanctionable activities.
- Sec. 220. Reports on, and authorization of imposition of sanctions with respect to, the provision of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and other sanctioned Iranian financial institutions.
- Sec. 221. Identification of, and immigration restrictions on, senior officials of the Government of Iran and their family members.
- Sec. 222. Sense of Congress and rule of construction relating to certain authorities of State and local governments.
- Sec. 223. Government Accountability Office report on foreign entities that invest in the energy sector of Iran or export refined petroleum products to Iran.
- Sec. 224. Reporting on the importation and exportation from Iran of crude oil and refined petroleum products.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

- Subtitle A—Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to, Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons
- Sec. 301. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect to, officials, agents, and affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- Sec. 302. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect to, persons that support or conduct certain transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned persons.
- Sec. 303. Identification of, and imposition of measures with respect to, foreign government agencies carrying out activities or transactions with certain Iran-affiliated persons.
- Sec. 304. Rule of construction.
- Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Sec. 311. Expansion of procurement prohibition to foreign persons that engage in certain transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- Sec. 312. Determinations of whether the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company are agents or affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

TITLE IV—MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

Subtitle A—Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in Iran

- Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.
- Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit human rights abuses.
- Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in censorship or other related activities against citizens of Iran.

Subtitle B—Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights

- Sec. 411. Codification of sanctions with respect to grave human rights abuses by the governments of Iran and Syria using information technology.
- Sec. 412. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of procurement ban under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
- Sec. 413. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of certain human rights-, humanitarian-, and democracy-related activities with respect to Iran.
- Sec. 414. Comprehensive strategy to promote Internet freedom and access to information in Iran.
- Sec. 415. Statement of policy on political prisoners.

TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS

- Sec. 501. Exclusion of citizens of Iran seeking education relating to the nuclear and energy sectors of Iran.
- Sec. 502. Interests in certain financial assets of Iran.
- Sec. 503. Technical correction to section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
- Sec. 504. Expansion of sanctions under section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
- Sec. 505. Reports on natural gas exports from Iran.
- Sec. 506. Report on membership of Iran in international organizations.
- Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on exportation of goods, services, and technologies for aircraft produced in the United States.

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

- Sec. 601. Implementation; penalties.
- Sec. 602. Applicability to certain intelligence activities.
- Sec. 603. Applicability to certain natural gas projects.
- Sec. 604. Rule of construction with respect to use of force against Iran and Syria.
- Sec. 605. Termination.

TITLE VII—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA

- Sec. 701. Short title.
- Sec. 702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Syria or their family members.
- Sec. 703. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods or technologies to Syria that are likely to be used to commit human rights abuses.

- Sec. 704. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in censorship or other forms of repression in Syria.

- Sec. 705. Waiver.
- Sec. 706. Termination.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

Except as otherwise specifically provided, in this Act:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(2) **FINANCIAL TRANSACTION.**—The term “financial transaction” means any transfer of value involving a financial institution, including the transfer of forwards, futures, options, swaps, or precious metals, including gold, silver, platinum, and palladium.

(3) **KNOWINGLY.**—The term “knowingly” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(4) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).

TITLE I—EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME AND EXPANSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS.

It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and other threatening activities can be effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that includes economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military planning, capabilities and options, and that this objective is consistent with the one stated by President Barack Obama in the 2012 State of the Union Address: “Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal”. Among the economic measures to be taken are—

(1) prompt enforcement of the current multilateral sanctions regime with respect to Iran;

(2) full, timely, and vigorous implementation of all sanctions enacted into law, including sanctions imposed or expanded by this Act or amendments made by this Act, through—

(A) intensified monitoring by the President and the designees of the President, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, and senior officials in the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), as appropriate;

(B) more extensive use of extraordinary authorities provided for under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and other sanctions laws;

(C) reallocation of resources to provide the personnel necessary, within the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce, and, where appropriate, the intelligence community, to apply and enforce sanctions; and

(D) expanded cooperation with international sanctions enforcement efforts;

(3) urgent consideration of the expansion of existing sanctions with respect to such areas as—

(A) the provision of energy-related services to Iran;

(B) the provision of insurance and reinsurance services to Iran;

(C) the provision of shipping services to Iran; and

(D) those Iranian financial institutions not yet designated for the imposition of sanctions

that may be acting as intermediaries for Iranian financial institutions that are designated for the imposition of sanctions; and

(4) a focus on countering Iran's efforts to evade sanctions, including—

(A) the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and satellite service providers, in and outside of Iran, to ensure that such providers are not participating in or facilitating, directly or indirectly, the evasion of the sanctions regime with respect to Iran or violations of the human rights of the people of Iran;

(B) the activities of financial institutions or other businesses or government agencies, in or outside of Iran, not yet designated for the imposition of sanctions; and

(C) urgent and ongoing evaluation of Iran's energy, national security, financial, and telecommunications sectors, to gauge the effects of, and possible defects in, particular sanctions, with prompt efforts to correct any gaps in the existing sanctions regime with respect to Iran.

SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO EXPAND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME.

(a) **MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.**—Congress urges the President to intensify diplomatic efforts, both in appropriate international fora such as the United Nations and bilaterally with allies of the United States, for the purpose of—

(1) expanding the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime to include—

(A) a prohibition on the issuance of visas to any official of the Government of Iran who is involved in—

(i) human rights violations in or outside of Iran;

(ii) the development of a nuclear weapons program and a ballistic missile capability in Iran; or

(iii) support by the Government of Iran for terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah; and

(B) a requirement that each member country of the United Nations—

(i) prohibit the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines from landing at seaports, and cargo flights of Iran Air from landing at airports, in that country because of the role of those organizations in proliferation and illegal arms sales; and

(ii) apply the prohibitions described in clause (i) to other Iranian entities designated for the imposition of sanctions on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;

(2) expanding the range of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by allies of the United States;

(3) expanding efforts to limit the development of petroleum resources and the importation of refined petroleum products by Iran;

(4) developing additional initiatives to—

(A) increase the production of crude oil in countries other than Iran; and

(B) assist countries that purchase or otherwise obtain crude oil or petroleum products from Iran to eliminate their dependence on crude oil and petroleum products from Iran; and

(5) eliminating the revenue generated by the Government of Iran from the sale of petrochemical products produced in Iran to other countries.

(b) **REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the extent to which diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a) have been successful that includes—

(1) an identification of the countries that have agreed to impose sanctions or take other measures to further the policy set forth in subsection (a);

(2) the extent of the implementation and enforcement of those sanctions or other measures by those countries;

(3) the criteria the President uses to determine whether a country has significantly reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran pursuant to sec-

tion 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by section 504, including considerations of reductions both in terms of volume and price;

(4) an identification of the countries that have not agreed to impose such sanctions or measures, including such countries granted exceptions for significant reductions in crude oil purchases pursuant to such section 1245(d)(4)(D);

(5) recommendations for additional measures that the United States could take to further diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a); and

(6) the disposition of any decision with respect to sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by the World Trade Organization or its predecessor organization.

TITLE II—EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN

Subtitle A—Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.

Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “WITH RESPECT TO” and all that follows through “TO IRAN” and inserting “RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN”;

(2) in paragraph (1)(A)—

(A) by striking “3 or more” and inserting “5 or more”; and

(B) by striking “the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010” and inserting “the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”;

(3) in paragraph (2)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)—

(i) by striking “3 or more” and inserting “5 or more”; and

(ii) by striking “the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010” and inserting “the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period at the end the following: “or directly associated infrastructure, including construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined petroleum products”;

(4) in paragraph (3)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)—

(i) by striking “3 or more” and inserting “5 or more”; and

(ii) by striking “the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010” and inserting “the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”;

(B) in subparagraph (B)—

(i) in clause (ii), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(iv) bartering or contracting by which goods are exchanged for goods, including the insurance or reinsurance of such exchanges; or

“(v) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating the issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, including governmental bonds, issued on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.”; and

(5) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) **JOINT VENTURES WITH IRAN RELATING TO DEVELOPING PETROLEUM RESOURCES.**—

“(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly participates, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in a joint venture

with respect to the development of petroleum resources outside of Iran if—

“(i) the joint venture is established on or after January 1, 2002; and

“(ii)(I) the Government of Iran is a substantial partner or investor in the joint venture; or

“(II) Iran could, through a direct operational role in the joint venture or by other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources in Iran.

“(B) **APPLICABILITY.**—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture established on or after January 1, 2002, and before the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, if the person participating in the joint venture terminates that participation not later than the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment.

“(5) **SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN IRAN.**—

“(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in subparagraph (B)—

“(i) any of which has a fair market value of \$1,000,000 or more; or

“(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of \$5,000,000 or more.

“(B) **GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.**—Goods, services, technology, or support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or enhancement of Iran's—

“(i) ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran; or

“(ii) domestic production of refined petroleum products, including any direct and significant assistance with respect to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum refineries or directly associated infrastructure, including construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined petroleum products.

“(6) **DEVELOPMENT AND PURCHASE OF PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS FROM IRAN.**—

“(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in subparagraph (B)—

“(i) any of which has a fair market value of \$250,000 or more; or

“(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of \$1,000,000 or more.

“(B) **GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.**—Goods, services, technology, or support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that could directly and significantly contribute to the maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of petrochemical products.”.

SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL FROM IRAN AND EVASION OF SANCTIONS BY SHIPPING COMPANIES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 201, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“(7) TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL FROM IRAN.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that—

“(i) the person is a controlling beneficial owner of, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, or insures, a vessel that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, was used to transport crude oil from Iran to another country; and

“(ii)(I) in the case of a person that is a controlling beneficial owner of the vessel, the person had actual knowledge the vessel was so used; or

“(II) in the case of a person that otherwise owns, operates, or controls, or insures, the vessel, the person knew or should have known the vessel was so used.

“(B) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to the transportation of crude oil from Iran only if a determination of the President under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the time of the transportation of the crude oil.

“(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the transportation of crude oil from Iran to a country to which the exception under paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) to the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that section applies at the time of the transportation of the crude oil.

“(8) CONCEALING IRANIAN ORIGIN OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person is a controlling beneficial owner, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, a vessel that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, is used, with actual knowledge in the case of a person that is a controlling beneficial owner or knowingly in the case of a person that otherwise owns, operates, or controls the vessel, in a manner that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, including by—

“(i) permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend the operation of the vessel’s satellite tracking device; or

“(ii) obscuring or concealing the ownership, operation, or control of the vessel by—

“(I) the Government of Iran;

“(II) the National Iranian Tanker Company or the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines; or

“(III) any other entity determined by the President to be owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or an entity specified in subsection (II).

“(B) ADDITIONAL SANCTION.—Subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe and in addition to the sanctions imposed under subparagraph (A), the President may prohibit a vessel owned, operated, or controlled by a person, including a controlling beneficial owner, with respect to which the President has imposed sanctions under that subparagraph and that was used for the activity for which the President imposed those sanctions from landing at a port in the United States for a period of not

more than 2 years after the date on which the President imposed those sanctions.

“(C) VESSELS IDENTIFIED BY THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL.—For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), a person shall be deemed to have actual knowledge that a vessel is owned, operated, or controlled by the Government of Iran or an entity specified in subclause (II) or (III) of subparagraph (A)(ii) if the International Maritime Organization vessel registration identification for the vessel is—

“(i) included on a list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for activities with respect to Iran; and

“(ii) identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control as a vessel in which the Government of Iran or any entity specified in subclause (II) or (III) of subparagraph (A)(ii) has an interest.

“(D) DEFINITION OF IRANIAN ORIGIN.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ‘Iranian origin’ means—

“(i) with respect to crude oil, that the crude oil was extracted in Iran; and

“(ii) with respect to a refined petroleum product, that the refined petroleum product was produced or refined in Iran.

“(9) EXCEPTION FOR PROVISION OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES AND INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE.—The President may not impose sanctions under paragraph (7) or (8) with respect to a person that provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if the President determines that the person has exercised due diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of crude oil or refined petroleum products from Iran in a manner for which sanctions may be imposed under either such paragraph.”

(b) REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prescribe such regulations or guidelines as are necessary to implement paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as added by this section, including such regulations or guidelines as are necessary to implement subparagraph (B) of such paragraph (8).

SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT BY IRAN OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and

(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:

“(1) EXPORTS, TRANSFERS, AND TRANSHIPMENTS.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person—

“(A) on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, exported or transferred, or permitted or otherwise facilitated the transshipment of, any goods, services, technology, or other items to any other person; and

“(B) knew or should have known that—

“(i) the export, transfer, or transshipment of the goods, services, technology, or other items would likely result in another person exporting, transferring, transshipping, or otherwise providing the goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran; and

“(ii) the export, transfer, transshipment, or other provision of the goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to—

“(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

“(II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.

“(2) JOINT VENTURES RELATING TO THE MINING, PRODUCTION, OR TRANSPORTATION OF URANIUM.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly participated, on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in a joint venture that involves any activity relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium—

“(i)(I) established on or after February 2, 2012; and

“(II) with—

“(aa) the Government of Iran;

“(bb) an entity incorporated in Iran or subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran; or

“(cc) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran or an entity described in item (bb); or

“(ii)(I) established before February 2, 2012;

“(II) with the Government of Iran, an entity described in item (bb) of clause (i)(II), or a person described in item (cc) of that clause; and

“(III) through which—

“(aa) uranium is transferred directly to Iran or indirectly to Iran through a third country;

“(bb) the Government of Iran receives significant revenue; or

“(cc) Iran could, through a direct operational role or by other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran that could contribute materially to the ability of Iran to develop nuclear weapons or related technologies.

“(B) APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture established before the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 if the person participating in the joint venture terminates that participation not later than the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this section and sections 201 and 202, is further amended—

(1) in section 5—

(A) in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section—

(i) by striking “paragraph (1)” each place it appears and inserting “paragraph (1) or (2)”; and

(ii) in subparagraph (F)—

(I) by striking “that paragraph” and inserting “paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be”; and

(II) by striking “the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010” and inserting “the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012”;

(B) in subsection (c)—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsections (a) and (b)(1)” and inserting “subsection (a) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b)”; and

(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (a) or (b)(1)” and inserting “subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)”; and

(C) in subsection (f)—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (a) or (b)(1)” and inserting “subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)”; and

(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and

(2) in section 9, by striking “section 5(a) or 5(b)(1)” each place it appears and inserting “subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b) of section 5”.

SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (12); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following:

“(9) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person.

“(10) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person.

“(11) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to activities described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this title, commenced on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 205. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER STANDARD UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 203, is further amended by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:

“(1) AUTHORITY.—

“(A) SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.—The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period of not more than one year, the requirement in section 5(a) to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person described in section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days or more after the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is essential to the national security interests of the United States to exercise such waiver authority.

“(B) SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period of not more than one year, the requirement in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 5(b) to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person described in section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, 30 days or more after the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to exercise such waiver authority.

“(C) RENEWAL OF WAIVERS.—The President may renew, on a case-by-case basis, a waiver with respect to a person under subparagraph (A) or (B) for additional one-year periods if, not later than 30 days before the waiver expires, the President makes the determination and submits to the appropriate congressional committees the report described in subparagraph (A) or (B), as applicable.”.

SEC. 206. BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(f) BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and every 120 days thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appro-

priate congressional committees a comprehensive briefing on efforts to implement this Act.”.

SEC. 207. EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (17) and (18) as paragraphs (20) and (21), respectively;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as paragraphs (17) and (18), respectively;

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (14) as paragraphs (5) through (15), respectively;

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

“(4) CREDIBLE INFORMATION.—The term ‘credible information’, with respect to a person—

“(A) includes—

“(i) a public announcement by the person that the person has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 5; and

“(ii) information set forth in a report to stockholders of the person indicating that the person has engaged in such an activity; and

“(B) may include, in the discretion of the President—

“(i) an announcement by the Government of Iran that the person has engaged in such an activity; or

“(ii) information indicating that the person has engaged in such an activity that is set forth in—

“(I) a report of the Government Accountability Office, the Energy Information Administration, or the Congressional Research Service; or

“(II) a report or publication of a similarly reputable governmental organization or trade or industry organization.”;

(5) by inserting after paragraph (15), as redesignated by paragraph (3), the following:

“(16) PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCT.—The term ‘petrochemical product’ includes any aromatic, olefin, or synthesis gas, and any derivative of such a gas, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea.”; and

(6) by inserting after paragraph (18), as redesignated by paragraph (2), the following:

“(19) SERVICES.—The term ‘services’ includes software, hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering, and specialized energy information services, energy-related technical assistance, and maintenance and repairs.”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to activities described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this title, commenced on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the energy sector of Iran remains a zone of proliferation concern since the Government of Iran continues to divert substantial revenues derived from sales of petroleum resources to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities; and

(2) the President should apply the full range of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, to address the threat posed by the Government of Iran.

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran

SEC. 211. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISION OF VESSELS OR SHIPPING SERVICES TO TRANSPORT CERTAIN GOODS RELATED TO PROLIFERATION OR TERRORISM ACTIVITIES TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), if the President determines that a person, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or

any other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of international terrorism, the President shall, pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the persons specified in subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(b) PERSONS SPECIFIED.—The persons specified in this subsection are—

(1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a vessel or provided insurance or reinsurance or another shipping service described in subsection (a); and

(2) any person that—

(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known that the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, leased, or provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service; or

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the sale, lease, or provision of the vessel or the provision of the insurance or reinsurance or other shipping service.

(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the requirement to impose sanctions with respect to a person under subsection (a) on or after the date that is 30 days after the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the reasons for that determination.

(d) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying operators of vessels and other persons that conduct or facilitate significant financial transactions with persons that manage ports in Iran that have been designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to designate persons for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to the blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

SEC. 212. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROVISION OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES OR INSURANCE OR REINSURANCE FOR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY OR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 204, with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a successor entity to either such company.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—

(1) UNDERWRITERS AND INSURANCE PROVIDERS EXERCISING DUE DILIGENCE.—The President is authorized not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person that provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if the President determines that the person has exercised due diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a successor entity to either such company.

(2) FOOD; MEDICINE; HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—The President may not impose sanctions under subsection (a) for the provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for any activity relating solely to—

(A) the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran; or

(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran.

(3) TERMINATION PERIOD.—The President is authorized not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person if the President receives reliable assurances that the person will terminate the provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and any successor entity to either such company, not later than the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(2) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(3) MEDICINE.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(d) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:

(1) Subsection (c) of section 4.

(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.

(3) Section 8.

(4) Section 9.

(5) Section 11.

(6) Section 12.

(7) Subsection (b) of section 13.

(8) Section 14.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to impose sanctions pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Ac-

countability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), or any other provision of this Act.

SEC. 213. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PURCHASE, SUBSCRIPTION TO, OR FACILITATION OF THE ISSUANCE OF IRANIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 204, with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance of—

(1) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran issued on or after such date of enactment, including governmental bonds; or

(2) debt of any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran issued on or after such date of enactment, including bonds.

(b) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:

(1) Subsection (c) of section 4.

(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.

(3) Section 8.

(4) Section 9.

(5) Section 11.

(6) Section 12.

(7) Subsection (b) of section 13.

(8) Section 14.

SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SUBSIDIARIES AND AGENTS OF PERSONS SANCTIONED BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2)(B) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(B)) is amended—

(1) by striking “of a person subject” and inserting the following: “of—

“(i) a person subject”;

(2) in clause (i), as designated by paragraph (1), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; or”;

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause (i);”.

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) as are necessary to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a).

SEC. 215. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS SANCTIONED FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO TERRORISM OR PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) is amended in the matter preceding subclause (I) by striking “financial institution” and inserting “person”.

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) as are necessary to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).

SEC. 216. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 the following:

“SEC. 104A. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the Secretary of the Treasury shall revise the regulations prescribed under section 104(c)(1) to apply to a foreign financial institution described in subsection (b) to the same extent and in the same manner as those regulations apply to a foreign financial institution that the Secretary of the Treasury finds knowingly engages in an activity described in section 104(c)(2).

“(b) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DESCRIBED.—A foreign financial institution described in this subsection is a foreign financial institution, including an Iranian financial institution, that the Secretary of the Treasury finds—

“(1) knowingly facilitates, or participates or assists in, an activity described in section 104(c)(2), including by acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or as an intermediary for, or otherwise assisting, another person with respect to the activity;

“(2) attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in such an activity; or

“(3) is owned or controlled by a foreign financial institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in such an activity.

“(c) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of—

“(A) the effect of the regulations prescribed under section 104(c)(1) on the financial system and economy of Iran and capital flows to and from Iran; and

“(B) the ways in which funds move into and out of financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii), with specific attention to the use of other Iranian financial institutions and other foreign financial institutions to receive and transfer funds for financial institutions described in that section.

“(2) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

“(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘financial institution’ means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (R), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

“(2) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘foreign financial institution’ has the meaning of that term as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i).

“(3) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Iranian financial institution’ means—

“(A) a financial institution organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, including a foreign branch of such an institution;

“(B) a financial institution located in Iran;

“(C) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by the Government of Iran; and

“(D) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by a financial institution described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 104 the following:

“Sec. 104A. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain activities.”.

SEC. 217. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN, AND SANCTIONS EVADERS.

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in Executive Order 13599 (77 Fed. Reg. 6659), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until the date that is 90 days after the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described in subsection (d).

(b) SANCTIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS.—United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in Executive Order 13608 (77 Fed. Reg. 26409), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).

(c) CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.—In addition to the sanctions referred to in subsection (a), the President shall continue to apply to the Central Bank of Iran sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), including blocking of property and restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of property, until the date that is 90 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the certification described in subsection (d).

(d) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The certification described in this subsection is the certification of the President to Congress that the Central Bank of Iran is not—

(A) providing financial services in support of, or otherwise facilitating, the ability of Iran to—

(i) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or related technologies;

(ii) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear capability; or

(iii) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons; or

(B) facilitating transactions or providing financial services for—

(i) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or

(ii) financial institutions the property or interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) in connection with—

(I) Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; or

(II) Iran's support for international terrorism.

(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit the certification described in paragraph (1) to the appropriate congressional committees in writing and shall include a justification for the certification.

(B) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).

SEC. 218. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ENTITY.—The term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization.

(2) OWN OR CONTROL.—The term “own or control” means, with respect to an entity—

(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity;

(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or

(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

(b) PROHIBITION.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States from knowingly engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that would be prohibited by an order or regulation issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the United States.

(c) CIVIL PENALTY.—The civil penalties provided for in section 206(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b)) shall apply to a United States person to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act if an entity owned or controlled by the United States person and established or maintained outside the United States violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any order or regulation issued to implement subsection (b).

(d) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (c) shall not apply with respect to a transaction described in subsection (b) by an entity owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States if the United States person divests or terminates its business with the entity not later than the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 219. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(r) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

“(A) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);

“(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) or a transaction described in subsection (d)(1) of that section;

“(C) knowingly engaged in an activity described in section 105A(b)(2) of that Act; or

“(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with—

“(i) any person the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to Exec-

utive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);

“(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or

“(iii) any person or entity identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran) without the specific authorization of a Federal department or agency.

“(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—If an issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the issuer shall disclose a detailed description of each such activity, including—

“(A) the nature and extent of the activity;

“(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

“(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

“(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

“(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

“(A) transmit the report to—

“(i) the President;

“(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

“(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the information available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

“(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1) (other than an activity described in subparagraph (D)(iii) of that paragraph), the President shall—

“(A) initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), section 104 or 105A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, an Executive Order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), or any other provision of law relating to the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran, as applicable; and

“(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an investigation, make a determination with respect to whether sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).

“(6) SUNSET.—The provisions of this subsection shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 220. REPORTS ON, AND AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, THE PROVISION OF SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES TO THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER SANCTIONED IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) providers of specialized financial messaging services are a critical link to the international financial system;

(2) the European Union is to be commended for strengthening the multilateral sanctions regime against Iran by deciding that specialized financial messaging services may not be provided to the Central Bank of Iran and other sanctioned Iranian financial institutions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the European Union; and

(3) the loss of access by sanctioned Iranian financial institutions to specialized financial messaging services must be maintained.

(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains—

(A) a list of all persons that the Secretary has identified that directly provide specialized financial messaging services to, or enable or facilitate direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and

(B) a detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the Secretary to end the direct provision of such messaging services to, and the enabling or facilitation of direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in that section.

(2) ENABLING OR FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES THROUGH INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—For purposes of paragraph (1) and subsection (c), enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized financial messaging services for the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) includes doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institution with access to such messaging services.

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), if, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a person continues to knowingly and directly provide specialized financial messaging services to, or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in paragraph (2)(E)(ii) of section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)), the President may impose sanctions pursuant to that section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the person.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The President may not impose sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to a person for directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) if—

(A) the person is subject to a sanctions regime under its governing foreign law that requires it to eliminate the knowing provision of such messaging services to, and the knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect access to such messaging services for—

(i) the Central Bank of Iran; and
(ii) a group of Iranian financial institutions identified under such governing foreign law for purposes of that sanctions regime if the President determines that—

(I) the group is substantially similar to the group of financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and

(II) the differences between those groups of financial institutions do not adversely affect the national interest of the United States; and

(B) the person has, pursuant to that sanctions regime, terminated the knowing provision of such messaging services to, and the knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran and each Iranian financial institution identified under such governing foreign law for purposes of that sanctions regime.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).

SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS ON, SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

(a) IDENTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall publish a list of each individual the President determines is—

(1) a senior official of the Government of Iran described in subsection (b) that is involved in Iran's—

(A) illicit nuclear activities or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction;

(B) support for international terrorism; or

(C) commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their family members; or

(2) a family member of such an official.

(b) SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN DESCRIBED.—A senior official of the Government of Iran described in this subsection is any senior official of that Government, including—

(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;

(2) the President of Iran;

(3) a member of the Cabinet of the Government of Iran;

(4) a member of the Assembly of Experts;

(5) a senior member of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran; or

(6) a senior member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, including a senior member of a paramilitary organization such as Ansar-e Hezbollah or Basij-e Motaz'afin.

(c) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—Except as provided in subsection (d), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who is on the list required by subsection (a).

(d) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Subsection (c) shall not apply to an individual if admitting the individual to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international obligations.

(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) or (c) with respect to an individual if the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is essential to the national interests of the United States; and

(2) not less than 7 days before the waiver takes effect, notifies Congress of the waiver and the reason for the waiver.

SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO CERTAIN AUTHORITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support actions by States or local governments that are within their authority, including determining how investment assets are valued for purposes of safety and soundness of financial institutions and insurers, that are consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes of this Act and other Acts that are amended by this Act.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(j) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act or any other provision of law authorizing sanctions with respect to Iran shall be construed to abridge the authority of a State to issue and enforce rules governing the safety, soundness, and solvency of a financial institution subject to its jurisdiction or the business of insurance pursuant to the Act of March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1011 et seq.) (commonly known as the ‘McCarran-Ferguson Act’).”

SEC. 223. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON FOREIGN ENTITIES THAT INVEST IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN OR EXPORT REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO IRAN.

(a) INITIAL REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report—

(A) listing all foreign investors in the energy sector of Iran during the period specified in paragraph (2), including—

(i) entities that exported gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran;

(ii) entities involved in providing refined petroleum products to Iran, including—

(I) entities that provided ships to transport refined petroleum products to Iran; and

(II) entities that provided insurance or reinsurance for shipments of refined petroleum products to Iran; and

(iii) entities involved in commercial transactions of any kind, including joint ventures anywhere in the world, with Iranian energy companies; and

(B) identifying the countries in which gasoline and other refined petroleum products exported to Iran during the period specified in paragraph (2) were produced or refined.

(2) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in this paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and ending on the date that is 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) UPDATED REPORT.—Not later than one year after submitting the report required by subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1) for the one-year period beginning on the date that is 30 days before the date on which the preceding report was required to be submitted by this section.

SEC. 224. REPORTING ON THE IMPORTATION TO AND EXPORTATION FROM IRAN OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.

Section 110(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8518(b)) is amended by striking “a report containing the matters” and all that follows through the period at the end and

inserting the following: “a report, covering the 180-day period beginning on the date that is 30 days before the date on which the preceding report was required to be submitted by this section, that—

“(1) contains the matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1); and

“(2) identifies—

“(A) the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imported to and exported from Iran (including through swaps and similar arrangements);

“(B) the persons selling and transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products described in subparagraph (A), the countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons, and the countries in which those products were refined;

“(C) the sources of financing for imports to Iran of crude oil and refined petroleum products described in subparagraph (A); and

“(D) the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in—

“(i) developing upstream oil and gas production capacity;

“(ii) importing advanced technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries;

“(iii) converting existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries; or

“(iv) maintaining, upgrading, or expanding existing refineries or constructing new refineries.”.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

Subtitle A—Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to, Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons

SEC. 301. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, OFFICIALS, AGENTS, AND AFFILIATES OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the President shall—

(1) identify foreign persons that are officials, agents, or affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and

(2) for each foreign person identified under paragraph (1) that is not already designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)—

(A) designate that foreign person for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to that Act; and

(B) block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of that foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(b) PRIORITY FOR INVESTIGATION.—In identifying foreign persons pursuant to subsection (a)(1) as officials, agents, or affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the President shall give priority to investigating—

(1) foreign persons or entities identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran); and

(2) foreign persons for which there is a reasonable basis to find that the person has conducted or attempted to conduct one or more sensitive transactions or activities described in subsection (c).

(c) SENSITIVE TRANSACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A sensitive transaction or activity described in this subsection is—

(1) a financial transaction or series of transactions valued at more than \$1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution;

(2) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture, importation, exportation, or transfer of items needed for the development by Iran of nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles;

(3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's energy sector, including a transaction relating to the development of the energy resources of Iran, the exportation of petroleum products from Iran, the importation of refined petroleum to Iran, or the development of refining capacity available to Iran;

(4) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's petrochemical sector; or

(5) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515(c))).

(d) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a foreign person designated pursuant to subsection (a) for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(2) REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—The requirement to deny visas to and exclude aliens from the United States pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, including regulatory exceptions to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international obligations.

(e) WAIVER OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) or (d) with respect to a foreign person if the President—

(A) determines that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to do so; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the waiver applies; and

(ii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to remove any sanction of the United States in force with respect to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.

(a) IDENTIFICATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying foreign persons that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly—

(A) materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, agents, or affiliates the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);

(B) engage in a significant transaction or transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, agents, or affiliates—

(i) the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to that Act; or

(ii) that are identified under section 301(a)(1) or pursuant to paragraph (4)(A) of section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by section 312; or

(C) engage in a significant transaction or transactions with—

(i) a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), or 1929 (2010), or any other resolution that is adopted by the Security Council and imposes sanctions with respect to Iran or modifies such sanctions; or

(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause (i).

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(3) BARTER TRANSACTIONS.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “transaction” includes a barter transaction.

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—If the President determines under subsection (a)(1) that a foreign person has knowingly engaged in an activity described in that subsection, the President—

(1) shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 204; and

(2) may impose additional sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the person.

(c) TERMINATION.—The President may terminate a sanction imposed with respect to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (b) if the President determines that the person—

(1) no longer engages in the activity for which the sanction was imposed; and

(2) has provided assurances to the President that the person will not engage in any activity described in subsection (a)(1) in the future.

(d) WAIVER OF IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President—

(A)(i) determines that the person has ceased the activity for which sanctions would otherwise be imposed and has taken measures to prevent a recurrence of the activity; or

(ii) determines that it is essential to the national security interests of the United States to do so; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the waiver applies;

(ii) describes the activity that would otherwise subject the foreign person to the imposition of sanctions under subsection (b); and

(iii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(e) WAIVER OF IDENTIFICATIONS AND DESIGNATIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle and subject to paragraph (2), the President shall not be required to make any identification of a foreign person under subsection (a) or any identification or designation of a foreign person under section 301(a) if the President—

(1) determines that doing so would cause damage to the national security of the United States; and

(2) notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the exercise of the authority provided under this subsection.

(f) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.—The following provisions of

the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the imposition under subsection (b)(1) of sanctions relating to activities described in subsection (a)(1) to the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:

- (1) Subsections (c) and (e) of section 4.
- (2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
- (3) Section 8.
- (4) Section 9.
- (5) Section 11.
- (6) Section 12.
- (7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
- (8) Section 14.

SEC. 303. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES OR TRANSACTIONS WITH CERTAIN IRAN-AFFILIATED PERSONS.

(a) IDENTIFICATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies each agency of the government of a foreign country (other than Iran) that the President determines knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, or knowingly and materially engaged in a significant transaction with, any person described in paragraph (2).

(2) PERSON DESCRIBED.—A person described in this paragraph is—

(A) a foreign person that is an official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps that is designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);

(B) a foreign person that is designated and subject to financial sanctions pursuant to—

(i) the Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006);

(ii) Annex I of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007);

(iii) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008);

(iv) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010); or

(v) any subsequent and related United Nations Security Council resolution, or any annex thereto, that imposes new sanctions with respect to Iran or modifies existing sanctions with respect to Iran; or

(C) a foreign person that the agency knows is acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(b) IMPOSITION OF MEASURES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose any of the following measures with respect to an agency identified pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that the assistance, exports, or other support to be prohibited by reason of the imposition of the measures have contributed and would otherwise directly or indirectly contribute to the agency's capability to continue the activities or transactions for which the agency has been identified pursuant to subsection (a):

(A) No assistance may be provided to the agency under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) other than humanitarian assistance or the provision of food or other agricultural commodities.

(B) No sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may be made to the agency.

(C) No licenses for export of any item on the United States Munitions List that include the agency as a party to the license may be granted.

(D) No exports may be permitted to the agency of any goods or technologies controlled for national security reasons under the Export Administration Regulations, except that such prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities).

(E) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical assistance to the agency by international financial institutions in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).

(F) The United States shall deny to the agency any credit or financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, except that this paragraph shall not apply—

(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities);

(ii) to the provision of medicines, medical equipment, and humanitarian assistance; or

(iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture to support the purchase of food or other agricultural commodities.

(G) Additional restrictions as may be imposed pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impose measures with respect to programs under section 1501 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2632 note) and programs under the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.).

(c) TERMINATION.—The President may terminate any measures imposed with respect to an agency pursuant to subsection (b) if the President determines and notifies the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1)(A) a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2) with respect to which the agency is carrying out activities or transactions is no longer designated pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2); or

(B) any person described in subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)(2) with respect to which the agency is carrying out activities or transactions is no longer acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, any person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2);

(2) the agency is no longer carrying out activities or transactions for which the measures were imposed and has provided assurances to the United States Government that the agency will not carry out the activities or transactions in the future; or

(3) it is essential to the national security interest of the United States to terminate such measures.

(d) WAIVER.—If the President does not impose one or more measures described in subsection (b) with respect to an agency identified in the report required by subsection (a), the President shall include in the subsequent report an explanation as to why the President did not impose such measures.

(e) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act

and apply with respect to activities and transactions described in subsection (a) that are carried out on or after the later of—

(1) the date that is 45 days after such date of enactment; or

(2) the date that is 45 days after a person is designated as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2).

SEC. 304. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to designate foreign persons for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

Subtitle B—Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps

SEC. 311. EXPANSION OF PROCUREMENT PROHIBITION TO FOREIGN PERSONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by striking "Not later than 90 days" and inserting the following:

"(A) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5.—Not later than 90 days"; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

"(B) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to require a certification from each person that is a prospective contractor that the person, and any person owned or controlled by the person, does not knowingly engage in a significant transaction or transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials, agents, or affiliates the property and interests in property of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)."

(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) Section 6(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by subsection (a), is further amended—

(A) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), as designated by subsection (a)(1), by striking "issued pursuant to section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421)";

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) by striking "the revision" and inserting "the applicable revision"; and

(II) by striking "not more than 3 years" and inserting "not less than 2 years"; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking "issued pursuant to section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421)";

(C) in paragraph (5), by striking "in the national interest" and inserting "essential to the national security interests";

(D) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:

"(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

"(A) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term 'executive agency' has the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code.

"(B) FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The term 'Federal Acquisition Regulation' means the regulation issued pursuant to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.";

(E) in paragraph (7)—

(i) by striking "The revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)" and inserting the following:

"(A) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5.—The revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)(A)"; and

(ii) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.—The revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)(B) shall apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are issued on or after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.”.

(2) Section 101(3) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511(3)) is amended by striking “section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403)” and inserting “section 133 of title 41, United States Code”.

SEC. 312. DETERMINATIONS OF WHETHER THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY ARE AGENTS OR AFFILIATES OF IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company are not only owned and controlled by the Government of Iran but that those companies provide significant support to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.

(b) DETERMINATIONS.—Section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(4) DETERMINATIONS REGARDING NIOC AND NITC.—

“(A) DETERMINATIONS.—For purposes of paragraph (2)(E), the Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012—

“(i) determine whether the NIOC or the NITC is an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; and

“(ii) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the determinations made under clause (i), together with the reasons for those determinations.

“(B) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

“(C) APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS.—

“(i) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as provided in clause (ii), if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran, only if a determination of the President under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the time of the transaction or the provision of the service.

“(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not apply to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran if an exception under paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) applies to the country with primary jurisdiction over the for-

eign financial institution at the time of the transaction or the provision of the service.

“(iii) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The exceptions in clauses (i) and (ii) shall not be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions pursuant to the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) for an activity described in paragraph (2) to the extent the activity would meet the criteria described in that paragraph in the absence of the involvement of the NIOC or the NITC.

“(D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

“(i) NIOC.—The term ‘NIOC’ means the National Iranian Oil Company.

“(ii) NITC.—The term ‘NITC’ means the National Iranian Tanker Company.”.

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) WAIVER.—Section 104(f) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(f)) is amended by inserting “or section 104A” after “subsection (c)”.

(2) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Section 104(g) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(g)) is amended by striking “subsection (c)(1)” and inserting “paragraph (1) or (4) of subsection (c) or section 104A” both places it appears.

(d) APPLICABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If an exception to sanctions described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (4)(C) of section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subsection (b), applies to a person that engages in a transaction described in paragraph (2) at the time of the transaction, the President is authorized not to impose sanctions with respect to the transaction under—

(A) section 302(b)(1);

(B) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by section 216; or

(C) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.

(2) TRANSACTION DESCRIBED.—A transaction described in this paragraph is a transaction—

(A) solely for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran; and

(B) for which sanctions may be imposed solely as a result of the involvement of the National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian Tanker Company in the transaction under—

(i) section 302(b)(1);

(ii) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by section 216; or

(iii) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.

TITLE IV—MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

Subtitle A—Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in Iran

SEC. 401. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Supreme Leader of Iran, the President of Iran, senior members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, senior members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ansar-e-Hezbollah and Basij-e-Mostaz’afin, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Telecommunications are ultimately responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing a pattern and practice of serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people, and thus the President should include such persons on the list of persons who are responsible for or complicit in committing serious human rights abuses and subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).

(b) REPORT.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report with respect to whether each person described in subsection (a) is responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. For any such person who is not included in such report, the Secretary of State should describe in the report the reasons why the person was not included, including information on whether sufficient credible evidence of responsibility for such abuses was found.

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 402. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105 the following:

“SEC. 105A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose sanctions in accordance with subsection (c) with respect to each person on the list required by subsection (b).

“(b) LIST.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the President determines have knowingly engaged in an activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of enactment.

“(2) ACTIVITY DESCRIBED.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—A person engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the person—

“(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Iran, any entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, or any national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran; or

“(ii) provides services (including services relating to hardware, software, and specialized information, and professional consulting, engineering, and support services) with respect to goods or technologies described in subparagraph (C) after such goods or technologies are transferred to Iran.

“(B) APPLICABILITY TO CONTRACTS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS.—A person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A) without regard to whether the activity is carried out pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.

“(C) GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES DESCRIBED.—Goods or technologies described in this subparagraph are goods or technologies that the President determines are likely to be used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or instrumentalities (or by any other person on behalf of

the Government of Iran or any of such agencies or instrumentalities) to commit serious human rights abuses against the people of Iran, including—

“(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code), rubber bullets, police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades, electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or surveillance technology; or

“(ii) sensitive technology (as defined in section 106(c)).

“(3) SPECIAL RULE TO ALLOW FOR TERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY.—The President shall not be required to include a person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that—

“(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity described in paragraph (2) for which the President would otherwise have included the person on the list; and

“(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in any activity described in paragraph (2) in the future.

“(4) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—

“(A) each time the President is required to submit an updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A); and

“(B) as new information becomes available.

“(5) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

“(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

“(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public and posted on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.

“(c) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the President shall impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with respect to a person on the list required by subsection (b).

“(2) TRANSFERS TO IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.—In the case of a person on the list required by subsection (b) for transferring, or facilitating the transfer of, goods or technologies described in subsection (b)(2)(C) to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, or providing services with respect to such goods or technologies after such goods or technologies are transferred to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, the President shall—

“(A) impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with respect to the person; and

“(B) impose such other sanctions from among the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as the President determines appropriate.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 105 the following:

“Sec. 105A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit human rights abuses.”

SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) satellite service providers and other entities that have direct contractual arrangements to provide satellite services to the Government of Iran or entities owned or controlled by that Government should cease providing broadcast services to that Government and those entities

unless that Government ceases activities intended to jam or restrict satellite signals; and

(2) the United States should address the illegal jamming of satellite signals by the Government of Iran through the voice and vote of the United States in the United Nations International Telecommunications Union.

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended by section 402, is further amended by inserting after section 105A the following:

SEC. 105B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with respect to each person on the list required by subsection (b).

“(b) LIST OF PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the President determines have, on or after June 12, 2009, engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran that—

“(A) prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran; or

“(B) limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by that Government that would jam or restrict an international signal.

“(2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—

“(A) each time the President is required to submit an updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A); and

“(B) as new information becomes available.

“(3) FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

“(A) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

“(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public and posted on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.”

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended by section 402, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 105A the following:

“Sec. 105B. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in censorship or other related activities against citizens of Iran.”

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 401(b)(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(b)(1)) is amended—

(1) by inserting “, 105A(a), or 105B(a)” after “105(a)”; and

(2) by inserting “, 105A(b), or 105B(b)” after “105(b)”.

Subtitle B—Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights

SEC. 411. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND SYRIA USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.

United States sanctions with respect to Iran and Syria provided for in Executive Order 13606 (77 Fed. Reg. 24571), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect—

(1) with respect to Iran, until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President

submits to Congress the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and

(2) with respect to Syria, until the date on which the provisions of and sanctions imposed pursuant to title VII terminate pursuant to section 706.

SEC. 412. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN UNDER COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010.

The Secretary of State shall—

(1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the technologies that may be considered “sensitive technology” for purposes of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515), with special attention to new forms of sophisticated jamming, monitoring, and surveillance technology relating to mobile telecommunications and the Internet, and publish those guidelines in the Federal Register;

(2) determine the types of technologies that enable any indigenous capabilities that Iran has to disrupt and monitor information and communications in that country, and consider adding descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and

(3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines on the basis of technological developments and new information regarding transfers of technologies to Iran and the development of Iran’s indigenous capabilities to disrupt and monitor information and communications in Iran.

SEC. 413. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN, AND DEMOCRACY-RELATED ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Office of Foreign Assets Control, in consultation with the Department of State, shall establish an expedited process for the consideration of complete requests for authorization to engage in human rights-, humanitarian-, or democracy-related activities relating to Iran that are submitted by—

(1) entities receiving funds from the Department of State to engage in the proposed activity;

(2) the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and

(3) other appropriate agencies of the United States Government.

(b) PROCEDURES.—Requests for authorization under subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Office of Foreign Assets Control in conformance with the Office’s regulations, including section 501.801 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations). Applicants shall fully disclose the parties to the transactions as well as describe the activities to be undertaken. License applications involving the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or software to Iran shall include a copy of an official Commodity Classification issued by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, as part of the license application.

(c) FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW.—The Department of State shall complete a foreign policy review of a request for authorization under subsection (a) not later than 30 days after the request is referred to the Department by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

(d) LICENSE DETERMINATIONS.—License determinations for complete requests for authorization under subsection (a) shall be made not later than 90 days after receipt by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, with the following exceptions:

(1) Any requests involving the exportation or reexportation to Iran of goods, technology, or software listed on the Commerce Control List maintained pursuant to part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be processed in a

manner consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102-484) and other applicable provisions of law.

(2) Any other requests presenting unusual or extraordinary circumstances.

(e) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe such regulations as are appropriate to carry out this section.

SEC. 414. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive strategy to—

(1) assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and share information freely and safely via the Internet, including in Farsi and regional languages;

(2) support the development of counter-censorship technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake Internet activities without interference from the Government of Iran;

(3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure mobile and other communications through connective technology among human rights and democracy activists in Iran;

(4) provide resources for digital safety training for media and academic and civil society organizations in Iran;

(5) provide accurate and substantive Internet content in local languages in Iran;

(6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable human rights advocates seeking to organize, share information, and support human rights in Iran;

(7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and social network communications inside Iran, including—

(A) by expanding Voice of America's Persian News Network and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Radio Farda to provide hourly live news update programming and breaking news coverage capability 24 hours a day and 7 days a week; and

(B) by assisting telecommunications and software companies that are United States persons to comply with the export licensing requirements of the United States for the purpose of expanding such communications inside Iran;

(8) expand activities to safely assist and train human rights, civil society, and democracy activists in Iran to operate effectively and securely;

(9) identify and utilize all available resources to overcome attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals;

(10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate programming for and outreach to Iranian dissident communities;

(11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists in Iran; and

(12) discourage telecommunications and software companies from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of Iran.

SEC. 415. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLITICAL PRISONERS.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to support efforts to research and identify prisoners of conscience and cases of human rights abuses in Iran;

(2) to offer refugee status or political asylum in the United States to political dissidents in Iran if requested and consistent with the laws and national security interests of the United States;

(3) to offer to assist, through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with the relocation of such political prisoners to other countries if requested, as appropriate and with appropriate consideration for the national security interests of the United States; and

(4) to publicly call for the release of Iranian dissidents by name and raise awareness with re-

spect to individual cases of Iranian dissidents and prisoners of conscience, as appropriate and if requested by the dissidents or prisoners themselves or their families.

TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 501. EXCLUSION OF CITIZENS OF IRAN SEEKING EDUCATION RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR AND ENERGY SECTORS OF IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who is a citizen of Iran that the Secretary of State determines seeks to enter the United States to participate in coursework at an institution of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) to prepare the alien for a career in the energy sector of Iran or in nuclear science or nuclear engineering or a related field in Iran.

(b) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (a) applies with respect to visa applications filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 502. INTERESTS IN CERTAIN FINANCIAL ASSETS OF IRAN.

(a) INTERESTS IN BLOCKED ASSETS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any provision of law relating to sovereign immunity, and preempting any inconsistent provision of State law, a financial asset that is—

(A) held in the United States for a foreign securities intermediary doing business in the United States,

(B) a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked) that is property described in subsection (b), and

(C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including an asset of the central bank or monetary authority of the Government of Iran or any agency or instrumentality of that Government, that such foreign securities intermediary or a related intermediary holds abroad,

shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.

(2) COURT DETERMINATION REQUIRED.—In order to ensure that Iran is held accountable for paying the judgments described in paragraph (1) and in furtherance of the broader goals of this Act to sanction Iran, prior to an award turning over any asset pursuant to execution or attachment in aid of execution with respect to any judgments against Iran described in paragraph (1), the court shall determine whether Iran holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets described in subsection (b) and that no other person possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the assets described in subsection (b) under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. To the extent the court determines that a person other than Iran holds—

(A) equitable title to, or a beneficial interest in, the assets described in subsection (b) (excluding a custodial interest of a foreign securities intermediary or a related intermediary that holds the assets abroad for the benefit of Iran), or

(B) a constitutionally protected interest in the assets described in subsection (b), such assets shall be available only for execution or attachment in aid of execution to the extent of Iran's equitable title or beneficial interest therein and to the extent such execution or attachment does not infringe upon such constitutionally protected interest.

(b) FINANCIAL ASSETS DESCRIBED.—The financial assets described in this section are the financial assets that are identified in and the

subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in *Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.*, Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27, 2008, and extended by court orders dated June 23, 2009, May 10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain restrained by court order.

(c) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed—

(1) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to in subsection (b); or

(2) to apply to assets other than the assets described in subsection (b), or to preempt State law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, except as expressly provided in subsection (a)(1).

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) BLOCKED ASSET.—The term “blocked asset” —

(A) means any asset seized or frozen by the United States under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)) or under section 202 or 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 and 1702); and

(B) does not include property that—

(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of the license has been specifically required by a provision of law other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or

(ii) is property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the laws of the United States, and is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.

(2) FINANCIAL ASSET; SECURITIES INTERMEDIARY.—The terms “financial asset” and “securities intermediary” have the meanings given those terms in the Uniform Commercial Code, but the former includes cash.

(3) IRAN.—The term “Iran” means the Government of Iran, including the central bank or monetary authority of that Government and any agency or instrumentality of that Government.

(4) PERSON.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(B) ENTITY.—The term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization.

(5) TERRORIST PARTY.—The term “terrorist party” has the meaning given that term in section 201(d) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note).

(6) UNITED STATES.—The term “United States” includes all territory and waters, continental, or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(e) TECHNICAL CHANGES TO THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT.—

(1) TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(7), by inserting after “section 1605A” the following: “or section 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008)”; and

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) in paragraph (2)—

(I) by striking “(5), 1605(b), or 1605A” and inserting “(5) or 1605(b)”; and

(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting “, or”; and

(ii) by adding after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605A of this chapter or section 1605(a)(7) of this chapter (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based.”.

(2) **TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002.**—Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note) is amended by striking “section 1605(a)(7)” and inserting “section 1605A or 1605(a)(7)” (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008).”.

SEC. 503. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO SECTION 1245 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012.

(a) **EXCEPTION FOR SALES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 1245(d)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(2)) is amended—

(A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting “AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES,” after “SALES OF”; and

(B) in the text, by inserting “agricultural commodities,” after “sale of”.

(2) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1298).

(b) **REPORT OF ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 1245(d)(4)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(A)) is amended—

(A) by striking “60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter” and inserting “October 25, 2012, and the last Thursday of every other month thereafter”; and

(B) by striking “60-day period” and inserting “2-month period”.

(2) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on September 1, 2012.

SEC. 504. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 1245 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), as amended by section 503, is further amended—

(1) in subsection (d)—

(A) in paragraph (3), by striking “a foreign financial institution owned or controlled by the government of a foreign country, including”; and

(B) in paragraph (4)(D)—

(i) by striking “Sanctions imposed” and inserting the following:

“(i) **IN GENERAL.**—Sanctions imposed”;

(ii) in clause (i), as designated by clause (i) of this subparagraph—

(I) by striking “a foreign financial institution” and inserting “a financial transaction described in clause (ii) conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution”;

(II) by striking “institution has significantly” and inserting “institution—

“(I) has significantly reduced”;

(III) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(IV) by adding at the end the following:

“(II) in the case of a country that has previously received an exception under this subparagraph, has, after receiving the exception, reduced its crude oil purchases from Iran to zero.”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) **FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.**—A financial transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial institution is described in this clause if—

“(I) the financial transaction is only for trade in goods or services between the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution and Iran; and

“(II) any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.”;

(2) in subsection (h)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) **SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS.**—The terms ‘reduce significantly’, ‘significant reduction’, and ‘significantly reduced’, with respect to purchases from Iran of petroleum and petroleum products, include a reduction in such purchases in terms of price or volume toward a complete cessation of such purchases.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) **TERMINATION.**—The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).”.

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall apply with respect to financial transactions conducted or facilitated on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 505. REPORTS ON NATURAL GAS EXPORTS FROM IRAN.

(a) **REPORT BY ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a report on the natural gas sector of Iran that includes—

(1) an assessment of exports of natural gas from Iran;

(2) an identification of the countries that purchase the most natural gas from Iran;

(3) an assessment of alternative supplies of natural gas available to those countries;

(4) an assessment of the impact a reduction in exports of natural gas from Iran would have on global natural gas supplies and the price of natural gas, especially in countries identified under paragraph (2); and

(5) such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate.

(b) **REPORT BY PRESIDENT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 60 days after receiving the report required by subsection (a), the President shall, relying on information in that report, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(A) an assessment of—

(i) the extent to which revenues from exports of natural gas from Iran are still enriching the Government of Iran;

(ii) whether a sanctions regime similar to the sanctions regime imposed with respect to purchases of petroleum and petroleum products from Iran pursuant to section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by sections 503 and 504, or other measures could be applied effectively to exports of natural gas from Iran;

(iii) the geostrategic implications of a reduction in exports of natural gas from Iran, including the impact of such a reduction on the countries identified under subsection (a)(2);

(iv) alternative supplies of natural gas available to those countries; and

(v) the impact a reduction in exports of natural gas from Iran would have on global natural gas supplies and the price of natural gas and the impact, if any, on swap arrangements for natural gas in place between Iran and neighboring countries; and

(B) specific recommendations with respect to measures designed to limit the revenue received

by the Government of Iran from exports of natural gas; and

(C) any other information the President considers appropriate.

(2) **FORM OF REPORT.**—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 506. REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF IRAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than September 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report listing the international organizations of which Iran is a member and detailing the amount that the United States contributes to each such organization on an annual basis.

SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPORTATION OF GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES.

It is the sense of Congress that licenses to export or reexport goods, services, or technologies for aircraft produced in the United States should be provided only in situations in which such licenses are truly essential and in a manner consistent with the laws and foreign policy goals of the United States.

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 601. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.

(a) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out—

(1) sections 211, 212, 213, 217, 218, 220, 312, and 411, subtitle A of title III, and title VII;

(2) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by section 312; and

(3) sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subtitle A of title IV.

(b) **PENALTIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of a provision specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, or an order or regulation prescribed under such a provision, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.

(2) **PROVISIONS SPECIFIED.**—The provisions specified in this paragraph are the following:

(A) Sections 211, 212, 213, and 220, subtitle A of title III, and title VII.

(B) Sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subtitle A of title IV.

SEC. 602. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall apply to the authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

SEC. 603. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN NATURAL GAS PROJECTS.

(a) **EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN NATURAL GAS PROJECTS.**—Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall apply to any activity relating to a project—

(1) for the development of natural gas and the construction and operation of a pipeline to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe;

(2) that provides to Turkey and countries in Europe energy security and energy independence from the Government of the Russian Federation and other governments with jurisdiction over persons subject to sanctions imposed under this Act or amendments made by this Act; and

(3) that was initiated before the date of the enactment of this Act pursuant to a production-

sharing agreement, or an ancillary agreement necessary to further a production-sharing agreement, entered into with, or a license granted by, the government of a country other than Iran before such date of enactment.

(b) TERMINATION OF EXCEPTION.—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The exception under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a project described in that subsection on or after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) the percentage of the equity interest in the project held by or on behalf of an entity described in paragraph (2) has increased relative to the percentage of the equity interest in the project held by or on behalf of such an entity on January 1, 2002; or

(B) an entity described in paragraph (2) has assumed an operational role in the project.

(2) **ENTITY DESCRIBED.**—An entity described in this paragraph is—

(A) an entity—

(i) owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran); or

(ii) organized under the laws of Iran or with the participation or approval of the Government of Iran;

(B) an entity owned or controlled by an entity described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) a successor entity to an entity described in subparagraph (A).

SEC. 604. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAN AND SYRIA.

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.

SEC. 605. TERMINATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The provisions of sections 211, 212, 213, 218, 220, 221, and 501, title I, and subtitle A of title III shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).

(b) **AMENDMENT TO TERMINATION DATE OF COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010.**—Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by inserting “, and verifiably dismantled its,” after “development of”.

TITLE VII—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012”.

SEC. 702. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF SYRIA OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each person on the list required by subsection (b).

(b) **LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons who are officials of the Government of Syria or persons acting on behalf of that Government that the President determines, based on credible evidence, are responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Syria or their family mem-

bers, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Syria.

(2) **UPDATES OF LIST.**—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and

(B) as new information becomes available.

(3) **FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—

(A) **FORM.**—The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(B) **PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—The unclassified portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public and posted on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.

(4) **CONSIDERATION OF DATA FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.**—In preparing the list required by paragraph (1), the President shall consider credible data already obtained by other countries and nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in Syria, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government of Syria.

(c) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), including blocking of property and restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of property, subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe.

SEC. 703. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO SYRIA THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose sanctions described in section 702(c) with respect to—

(1) each person on the list required by subsection (b); and

(2) any person that—

(A) is a successor entity to a person on the list;

(B) owns or controls a person on the list, if the person that owns or controls the person on the list had actual knowledge or should have known that the person on the list engaged in the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for which the person was included in the list; or

(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with, the person on the list, if the person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as the case may be), the person on the list knowingly engaged in the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for which the person was included in the list.

(b) **LIST.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the President determines have knowingly engaged in an activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of enactment.

(2) **ACTIVITY DESCRIBED.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—A person engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the person—

(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Syria; or

(ii) provides services with respect to goods or technologies described in subparagraph (C) after such goods or technologies are transferred to Syria.

(B) **APPLICABILITY TO CONTRACTS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS.**—A person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A) without regard to whether the activity is carried out pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(C) **GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES DESCRIBED.**—Goods or technologies described in this subpara-

graph are goods or technologies that the President determines are likely to be used by the Government of Syria or any of its agencies or instrumentalities to commit human rights abuses against the people of Syria, including—

(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code), rubber bullets, police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades, electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or surveillance technology; or

(ii) sensitive technology.

(D) **SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY DEFINED.**—

(i) **IN GENERAL.**—For purposes of subparagraph (C), the term “sensitive technology” means hardware, software, telecommunications equipment, or any other technology, that the President determines is to be used specifically—

(I) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Syria; or

(II) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of the people of Syria.

(ii) **EXCEPTION.**—The term “sensitive technology” does not include information or informational materials the exportation of which the President does not have the authority to regulate or prohibit pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).

(3) **SPECIAL RULE TO ALLOW FOR TERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITY.**—The President shall not be required to include a person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity described in paragraph (2) for which the person would otherwise have included the person on the list; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in any activity described in paragraph (2) in the future.

(4) **UPDATES OF LIST.**—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and

(B) as new information becomes available.

(5) **FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—

(A) **FORM.**—The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(B) **PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—The unclassified portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public and posted on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.

SEC. 704. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER FORMS OF REPRESSION IN SYRIA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose sanctions described in section 702(c) with respect to each person on the list required by subsection (b).

(b) **LIST OF PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that the President determines have engaged in censorship, or activities relating to censorship, in a manner that prohibits, limits, or penalizes the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression by citizens of Syria.

(2) **UPDATES OF LIST.**—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated list under paragraph (1)—

(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and

(B) as new information becomes available.

(3) **FORM OF REPORT; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.**—

(A) **FORM.**—The list required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public and posted on the websites of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State.

SEC. 705. WAIVER.

The President may waive the requirement to include a person on a list required by section 702, 703, or 704 or to impose sanctions pursuant to any such section if the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the reasons for that determination.

SEC. 706. TERMINATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The provisions of this title and any sanctions imposed pursuant to this title shall terminate on the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) the certification described in subsection (b); and

(2) a certification that—

(A) the Government of Syria is democratically elected and representative of the people of Syria; or

(B) a legitimate transitional government of Syria is in place.

(b) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—A certification described in this subsection is a certification by the President that the Government of Syria—

(1) has unconditionally released all political prisoners;

(2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of Syria engaged in peaceful political activity;

(3) has ceased its practice of procuring sensitive technology designed to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Syria, or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict the right of citizens of Syria to freedom of expression;

(4) has ceased providing support for foreign terrorist organizations and no longer allows such organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to maintain facilities in territory under the control of the Government of Syria; and

(5) has ceased the development and deployment of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles;

(6) is not pursuing or engaged in the research, development, acquisition, production, transfer, or deployment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, and has provided credible assurances that it will not engage in such activities in the future; and

(7) has agreed to allow the United Nations and other international observers to verify that the Government of Syria is not engaging in such activities and to assess the credibility of the assurances provided by that Government.

(c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS AFTER ELECTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.—If the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described in subsection (a)(2), the President may suspend the provisions of this title and any sanctions imposed under this title for not more than 180 days to allow time for a certification described in subsection (b) to be submitted.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the gentleman from California (Mr. BERMAN) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, by prior agreement with the gentleman from California, who will do the same, I would like to yield 5 minutes of my time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.

KUCINICH) and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control those 5 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, are we apportioning that 5 minutes from each side?

Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BERMAN. At the point where I am recognized, I will be also seeking unanimous consent for the same kind of referral of time to your control.

Mr. KUCINICH. I withdraw my reservation.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would also yield 5 minutes of my time to the gentleman from Ohio and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control those 5 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the measure under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I have spoken on this floor many times about the Iranian threat and the need for action to stop it, but ultimately we will all be judged by a simple question: Did we stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability? If the answer is “no,” if we fail, then nothing else matters. If we fail, it would be of no comfort to the American people whose security and future would be put in danger. If we fail, it would be of no comfort to our ally, Israel, whose very existence would be put in danger.

History is full of avoidable tragedies, of foolish countries that have allowed their enemies to prepare to destroy them. The entire world now is fully aware of Iran's true intention. Now is the time to take a stand. As Sir Winston Churchill said:

You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word: victory. For without victory, there is no survival.

To get us on that path to victory, Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to render their full support to the Iran Threat Reduction and the Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, a bicameral, bipartisan agreement that represents the strongest set of sanctions ever put in place against the regime in Tehran. It black-

lists virtually all of Iran's energy, financial, and transportation sectors, and cuts off companies that keep doing business with Iran from access to our markets in the United States.

This legislation also imposes sanctions to prevent Iran from repatriating any proceeds from its oil sales, depriving the Iranian regime of 80 percent of its hard currency earnings and half of the funds that support its budget. This bill also imposes tough new sanctions on the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It also targets Iran's use of barter transactions to bypass sanctions, the provisions of insurance to Iran's energy sector. It also targets provisions of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran.

Mr. Speaker, in 1995, the late former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher said:

In terms of its organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which has been followed by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability.

That was in 1995.

Secretary Christopher added:

There is no room for complacency.

Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in '96. That law, now called the Iran Sanctions Act, sought to target Iran's economic lifeline—its energy sector—and denied Tehran the financial resources to pursue its nuclear ambitions, to sponsor violent Islamic groups, and to dominate the region.

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Regrettably, just a couple years after enactment of that law, the Clinton administration issued a blanket waiver of energy sector sanctions that has been continued by successive administrations.

In 1996, U.S. concerns were not shared by our allies in Europe and Asia, who argued that trade, dialogue, and engagement toward the Iranian regime would succeed in moderating Tehran's behavior. This allowed the Iranian threat to flourish.

However, Congress continued to develop new legislative countermeasures in the form of the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 to address these Iranian threats and to hold the regime accountable for its human rights violations, for its state sponsorship of violent extremists, and for its pursuit of a nuclear capability.

We have analyzed Iranian reaction and behavior in response to these new sanctions. We have looked at what steps our allies have undertaken and considered the actions, or the paralysis, of the United Nations. But most importantly, Mr. Speaker, we have intensified our response as the Iranian threat has evolved and grown.

We know that “the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” But far more than vigilance is needed in this case.

Which brings us to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, which we are considering today. This bipartisan, bicameral agreement seeks to tighten the choke hold on the regime beyond anything that has been done before. It sends a clear message that the American people, through their elected representatives, are fully committed to using every economic and political lever at their disposal to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.

Through this bill, we declare that the Iranian energy sector is off limits, and it blacklists any related unauthorized dealings. It will undermine Iran's ability to repatriate the revenues it receives from the sale of crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and funds needed to sustain its nuclear program. It prevents the purchasing of Iranian sovereign debt, thereby further limiting the regime's ability to finance its illicit activities. It also expands sanctions against Iranian and Syrian officials for human rights abuses, particularly those facilitated by computer and network disruption, monitoring, and tracking by those governments.

Yet we should be under no illusions, Mr. Speaker, that this legislation is a magic wand that we wave, and we will resolve the problem overnight. Sanctions have helped to knock the regime off balance. But unless the executive branch fully implements these measures immediately, the regime is likely to regain its footing and further speed up its nuclear march. So let us act now to stop that march.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by the Iranian regime is not just a threat to the United States, or to our allies, or to the Iranian people.

The Iranian regime is also a threat to the Syrian people, because of Iran's close ties and assistance, including weapons that have helped the regime in Syria to slaughter thousands.

Like Iran, Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism that poses a threat to the U.S., to our ally Israel, and to other responsible nations.

I hope to be back on the House floor in the near future with the Syria Freedom Support Act to address the totality of the Syrian threat, but today we stand ready to hold the Assad regime accountable for its gross human rights violations.

Today, we seek to ensure that neither of these brutal regimes has access to resources that would enable them to perpetuate their cruelty.

Those allies who, 16 years ago, wanted to engage and continue business as usual with Iran and who, until just a few years ago, were proposing expanded trade agreements with the Assad regime in Syria, have awoken to take a stand against the threatening activities of these pariah states.

Congress must carry out its responsibility to the American people and overwhelmingly adopt the bicameral, bipartisan agreement we are considering today.

I urge the President to quickly sign it into law and immediately and fully implement the sanctions it contains.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), a national leader on the issue of non-proliferation and human rights and particularly our efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, the Democratic whip of the House.

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

First, I want to rise and thank Chairwoman ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN for her continuing leadership and focus on this important issue, as she does on so many other issues as well.

Mr. Speaker, let me thank my friend, the gentleman from California and ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. BERMAN. His leadership on this issue in Congress is second to none, and I commend him for his work.

This is a bill I expect will pass with overwhelming support in both parties and for good reason. Iran cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. America's policy, as President Obama has stated, is prevention, not containment.

We have many tools at our disposal to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons technology. While President Obama is keeping all options on the table, the best diplomatic tool we have to deter Iran is the sanctions regime his administration has expanded along with our allies in Europe and elsewhere. These sanctions have already had a significant effect, and Iran continues to face the prospect of severe economic repercussions if they fail to abandon their nuclear weapons plan.

President Obama deserves credit for his tough stances. The new sanctions this legislation would impose target entities conducting business with Iran's insurance, energy, and shipping sectors. As a result of prohibitions on repatriating oil revenues, these sanctions would deny Iran 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. Iran's banking sector, including its central bank, is already sanctioned, a result of the Iranian Government's financial support for terrorism in the region and around the world.

There is no better evidence why this bill is so important than the fact that 2 weeks ago, a terrorist attack in Bulgaria killed six innocent civilians, five of them vacationing Israelis. There have been numerous press reports linking Iran to that attack.

As long as Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, call for the destruction of Israel, and provide arms to terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, it will face the consequences in the form of sanctions, isolation, and the continuing reality of the option of military action.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BERMAN. I am pleased to yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman. The United States continues to stand strongly with our ally Israel. And I am

proud to have led an effort earlier this year with the majority leader to strengthen U.S.-Israel military and intelligence relations.

I urge all of my colleagues to unite behind this bill, just as we did behind that one. A nuclear-armed Iran is not an option for the Middle East, for the international community, and for the United States.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Congressman RON PAUL, an American patriot, someone who has been relentless in his efforts to stop America from blundering into foreign adventures.

Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think this bill would be better named if we called it "Obsession with Iran Act of 2012" because this is what we continue to be doing—obsess with Iran and the idea that Iran is a threat to our national security.

Iran happens to be a Third World nation. They have no significant navy, air force, intercontinental ballistic missiles. The IAEA and our CIA say they are not on the verge of a nuclear weapon.

It's so similar to what we went through in the early part of this last decade where we were beating the war drums to go to war against Iraq. And it was all a facade. There was no danger from Iraq. So this is what we're doing, beating the war drums once again.

Since the bill has come back from the conference, if we are to deal with civil liberties in Syria—well, I happen to be a civil libertarian. I am very concerned about civil liberties. But let me tell you, this bill is not going to do anything to enhance the civil liberties of the individuals in Syria.

If we were really interested in civil liberties, why wouldn't we look to ourselves? Why wouldn't we look to the things we do here? What about our warrantless searches under the PATRIOT Act? What about the policy of assassination, assassinating American citizens? What about arrests by the military, the National Defense Authorization Act? What about the drone warfare that we go on? Do you think we are protecting civil liberties by arbitrarily dropping drones or threatening to drop drones anyplace in the world, with innocent people dying?

If we want to really care about civil liberties in Syria, why don't we care about the secret prisons we have and the history of torture that we have had in this country?

What about the fact that kill lists are being made by the executive branch of government, and we sit idly by and approve of it by saying nothing, and the American people put up with it, and we march in this direction, marching into a determination to have another war?

When you put sanctions on a country, it's an act of war, and that is what this is all about. The first thing you do when war breaks out between two

countries is you put sanctions on them. You blockade the country. So this is an act of war.

What would we do if somebody blockaded and put sanctions on us and prevented the importation of any product of this country? We would be furious. We would declare war. We would go to war.

□ 1440

So we are the antagonists. We're over there poking our nose and poking our nose in other people's affairs, just looking for a chance to start another war. First it's Syria and then Iran. We have too many wars. We need to stop the wars. We don't have the money to fight these wars any longer.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. TURNER), a member of our Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. TURNER of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I would like to applaud Chairwoman ROS-LEHTINEN's tireless effort on this legislation to ensure that Iran's terrorist regime does not threaten the security of the United States and our greatest ally in the Middle East, Israel.

I'm sure many of you remember that Iran was found by a Federal court to have been directly involved in both the 1983 attacks on the marine barracks in Beirut which killed 241 soldiers and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia where a suicide bomber killed 14 airmen. The victims and their families won a judgment in court against the Iranian Government, but have had difficulty enforcing it because Iran could hide behind sovereign immunity.

I introduced H.R. 4070, which is now part of this bill, to change a specific part of Federal law to allow assets seized from the Iranian Government to be allocated to the Beirut and Khobar Towers families to recover the judgments owed to them. It is time that Iran is held accountable for their involvement in the deaths of our soldiers.

I'm proud to say that this provision is truly bipartisan. My colleagues on both sides of the aisle stand together against Iran. By passing this bill today, we offer the victims' families the justice that they have long been denied.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 750, and I yield myself 2½ minutes.

The bill before us today marks a significant step forward in our sanctions effort against the Iranian regime and its illicit nuclear program, the sanctions effort which even Tehran acknowledges is already having a stressful impact on Iran's economy. I want to commend my colleague, ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, for her work on this legislation; and I'm proud to be the bill's chief cosponsor in the House.

Building on previous sanctions, this bill adds to what the gentlelady and I

set out to do when we introduced it. For example, through further limiting transitions with the Central Bank of Iran, an initiative I originated, this legislation restricts Iran's ability to repatriate the revenue it receives from its diminishing oil sales. It includes provisions that clamp down on Iran's oil exports by targeting the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company; and it expands sanctions on Iranian shipping, insurance, and financing in the energy sector.

The bill also increases sanctions on transactions with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the spearhead of Iran's nuclear proliferation and terrorism effort and the dominant player in the Iranian economy. Further, at my suggestion, this bill now includes a measure which expands CISADA sanctions beyond financial institutions to include more than 200 additional individuals and companies that have been linked to Iran's nuclear weapons of mass destruction and terrorism programs.

And of critical importance, this bill vastly strengthens sanctions on both Iranian and Syrian human rights abusers. These provisions are very important, but the Iranians should not be fooled into thinking this is the last word on sanctions. Far from it.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to call on the administration to implement the authorities we have given them, fully and without delay. Iran's nuclear clock is ticking, and time is not on our side. The actions the executive branch took yesterday, including the first-ever CISADA sanctions on foreign banks—more than 2 years after CISADA became law—are a good beginning, but Iran's nuclear weapons program continues apace. Every day, it is enriching more uranium and at higher levels.

The only hope we have for a peaceful solution is to apply enough pressure to ensure that Iran ends its nuclear weapons program. The bill before us and the action the administration has taken applies significantly more pressure; but let there be no doubt, there is more we can do and more that we will do if Iran doesn't end its nuclear weapons program verifiably and completely. We have more work to do.

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND
BLOCKED PERSONS LIST SEARCH (UPDATED:
6/25/2012)

NPWMD
ENTITIES/INDIVIDUALS

Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center; ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED; AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION; APZALI, Ali; ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED; ASHTEAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD.; ASSA CO. LTD.; ASSA CORP.; ATLANTIC INTERMODAL; AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE; BALDACCHINO, Adrian; BATENI, Naser; BEST PRECISE LIMITED; BIIS MARITIME LIMITED; BIIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LTD; BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; CARVANA COMPANY; CEMENT

INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY.

CIRE, Kursad Zafer; COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; CONCEPT GIANT LIMITED; CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE; DAJMAR, Mohhammad Hossein; DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH; Digital Media Lab; DIVANDARI, Ali; DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; DURANSOY, Cagri; DURANSOY, Muammer Kuntay; EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; Electronic Components Industries; ELECTRONICS INSTITUTE; ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; EZATI, Ali; FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD.

FALSAFI, Mahin; FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; FAROOQ, Muhammad; FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND; FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; Frosch, Daniel; FULMEN GROUP; GALLIOT MARITIME INC; GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza; GLOBAL INTERFACE COMPANY INC.; GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein; GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; Good Luck Shipping.

GREAT METHOD LIMITED; GREAT OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICES (L.L.C.); HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO; HIGHER INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH; IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED; INDUS MARITIME INC; International General Resourcing; IRAN AIR; IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL COMPANY; IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY; IRAN COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES; IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY; IRANAIR TOURS; IRINVESTSHIP LTD.; IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED; IRISL (UK) LTD.; IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.

IRISL EUROPE GMBH; IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY; IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.; IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY; ISI MARITIME LIMITED; ISIM AMIN LIMITED; ISIM ATR LIMITED; ISIM OLIVE LIMITED; ISIM SAT LIMITED; ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED; ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED; ISIM SININ LIMITED; ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED; ISIM TOUR LIMITED; ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES; JAFARI, Mani; JAFARI, Milad; JAFARI, Mohammad Javad; JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS; KAVERI MARITIME INC.

KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD; KHALIL, Jamshid; KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES; KOHAS AG; LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.; LERCH, Gotthard; LOGISTIC SMART LIMITED; LOWESWATER LIMITED; M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES; MACHINE PARDAZAN CO.; MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC A.S.; Malek Ashtar University; MALEKI, Naser; MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.; MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED; MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED; MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY; MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY; MEHR CAYMAN LTD.

MELODIOUS MARITIME INC; MILL DENE LIMITED; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; Ministry of Defense Logistics Export; MODALITY LIMITED; MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad; MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC;

MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT; NABIPOUR, Ghasem; NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG; NATIONAL STANDARDS AND CALIBRATION LABORATORY; NEKA NOVIN; NEUMAN LIMITED; NEW DESIRE LIMITED; NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY; OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH; PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST.

PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi; PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED; PARTO SANAT CO.; PAYA PARTOV CO.; PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.; PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA; PEARL SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C.; QANNADI, Mohammad; Rabiee, Hamid Reza; RISHI MARITIME INC; ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD; SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED; SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY; SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED; SARKANDI, Ahmad; SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTER; SECOND ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES; SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE; SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG.

SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIES GROUP; SHAHID BAKERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP; SHAHID SATTARI INDUSTRIES; SHALLON LIMITED; SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY; SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES; SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY; SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.; SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED; SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.; SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED; SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY; SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED; STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED; STEIGER, Jakob.

STEP A.S.; SYSTEM WISE LIMITED; TAFAZOLI, Ahmad; TAHIR, Buhary Seyed Abu; TALAI, Mohamad; TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY; THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD; TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED; TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED; TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION; TRADE TREASURE LIMITED.

TRANS MERITS CO. LTD.; TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED; TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH; TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG; UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED; VAHIDI, Ahmad; Value-Added Services Laboratory; VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK; VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD; WISSER, Gerhard; WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED; YASA PART; ZADEH, Hassan Jalil.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.

What this is doing is essentially stopping any kind of a negotiated deal and putting us on a path towards war with Iran. You know, it is likely that any negotiated deal that would prevent a nuclear-armed Iran would provide for Iranian enrichment for peaceful purposes under the framework of the nuclear nonproliferation weapons treaty with strict safeguards and inspections. So we're taking a path here that guarantees that we're put on a glide slope right to war. Why are we doing this, we

don't have enough wars in this country? We aren't involved in enough places around the world in war?

This is a bad resolution.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT), who is our subcommittee chairman on Middle East and South Asia of our Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentle lady for yielding and I thank her for her very strong support and leadership on this particular issue and on so many issues in this Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this well-crafted legislation which significantly ratchets up pressure on the regime in Tehran, as well as all those who support or enable its dangerous quest for a nuclear weapons capability. As we stand here today, Iran's centrifuges continue to spin and the regime inches closer to that very end. If allowed to cross that threshold, untold consequences would surely follow.

Iran, which former President George W. Bush aptly called the "world's primary state sponsor of terror," would no doubt feel emboldened in its meddling in the internal affairs of our gulf allies and in threats to U.S. global and regional interests. Questions of rationality aside, the regime would also have the ability to follow through on its repeated threats to eradicate the State of Israel. Iran cannot be allowed to acquire this capability, and I believe that this legislation may very well significantly enhance pressure on the regime.

The nuclear program is, however, a symptom of the disease rather than the disease itself. A nuclear program is not in and of itself what makes this particular regime so nefarious. Rather, it is the perverse nature of the regime that makes the nuclear program so dangerous. And there can be no doubt that the regime in Tehran is a blight upon the Iranian people and on the region, and, in fact, on the whole world. To speak of the nuclear program independently of the regime which pursues it is in effect putting the cart before the horse.

But this legislation does not fall into that trap. In addition to targeting the nuclear program, H.R. 1905 puts significant pressure on the regime for its horrific human rights abuses and supports the oppressed Iranian people in their fight for freedom.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this critical legislation, and I want to once again thank the distinguished chairwoman, Ms. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN from Florida, for her leadership on this issue. She has been pushing and pushing and pushing against this corrupt Iranian regime for such a long time, and to do right by our ally Israel, and ultimately to do what is in the best interest of the people of the United States as well. It is in nobody's interest to have a nuclear Iran, and so I want to thank her for her leadership.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the gen-

tleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Trade.

□ 1450

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to thank the chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee for her work on this bill and for reaching an agreement with the Senate Banking Committee, and I rise in strong support of this measure.

I especially want to thank the chairman for working with me on title III of this bill, as it reflects several years of our work together. Title III targets the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and began its life as H.R. 2379, then designated the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Designation Implementation Act, which I introduced along with the chairman in May of 2009.

These provisions impose tough secondary sanctions against any person, including foreign companies, that conduct any significant transaction with the IRGC or any of its designated fronts and affiliates. The IRGC, through its support of Hezbollah and its direct action, has much blood on its hands.

I want to thank the chairman and her staff for including section 303, which applies sanctions to countries and governments—not just companies—that conduct transactions or provide support for the IRGC and for provisions which indicate that if you want to be a Federal contractor, you must certify that you do not do prohibited business with the IRGC.

This bill also includes important provisions I first proposed in the Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act that will provide sanctions against those who lend money to the Iranian Government. It includes another provision I authored which will implement sanctions against those firms that give the Iranian Government the technologies for surveillance and repression of their own people.

This is not the final act, literally or figuratively. What we've done so far is not enough to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program. We ought to stay in session and pass even more sanctions against Iran.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the RECORD a statement by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, which says that the new sanctions push the U.S. and Iran closer to war.

NEW IRAN SANCTIONS PUSH U.S., IRAN CLOSER TOWARD WAR—FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

WASHINGTON, DC.—FCNL's Lobbyist on Middle East issues Kate Gould issued the following statement opposing the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905) that could reach the House floor as early as today:

The Friends Committee on National Legislation strongly opposes the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905). We believe this legislation would

undermine human rights in Iran and cripple the accountability of the diplomatic process now underway to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, pushing the U.S. and Iran closer toward a devastating war.

War is the ultimate human rights violation, and this bill lays the groundwork for war by escalating the scale of economic warfare that Congress would impose on ordinary Iranian citizens. As in the case of the decades of U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iraq that culminated in a U.S. invasion of that country, economic warfare punishes civilians, emboldens hardliners in Iran's regime, and forecloses diplomatic options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and war.

PUNISHING IRANIAN CIVILIANS

FCNL and ten other national advocacy and religious organizations from the human rights and peace and security community wrote to Senator Tim Johnson, Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, last week to oppose this bill, and to highlight the importance of keeping channels open for Iranians to have access to food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and services.

Ordinary Iranians already face tremendous difficulties in accessing basic medicine under sanctions. For example, this week, the board of directors of the Iranian Hemophilia Society informed the World Federation of Hemophilia that the lives of tens of thousands of children are being endangered by the lack of proper drugs, as a consequence of international sanctions.

The Iranian Hemophilia Society notes that U.S. and international sanctions technically do not ban medical goods. Yet, despite the 'humanitarian exemption' in U.S. sanctions laws, medicine is not getting in to Iran because the "sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and the country's other financial institutions have severely disrupted the purchase and transfer of medical goods."

The humanitarian exemption is of profound importance, as the U.S. business community and humanitarian organizations have pointed out. We are relieved that this legislation does not directly prohibit Iranians from accessing food, medicine, and humanitarian trade. However, if the Iranian civilian economy is destroyed by sanctions, then millions of Iranians will be deprived of their livelihoods, and unable to purchase the food, medicine, and other goods that the humanitarian exemption is supposed to protect. Further destabilization of the Iranian currency and decimation of the Iranian economy will push Iran closer to the state of Iraq when it was under sanctions. During that time, UNICEF estimated that U.N. sanctions contributed to the deaths of half a million children.

EMBOLDENING HARDLINERS IN IRAN

This bill would embolden hardliners in the Iranian regime, at the expense of the civilians who will overwhelmingly bear the brunt of these sanctions. Just as Saddam Hussein never missed a meal under the decades of sanctions against Iraq, top Iranian officials will not have difficulty accessing food and medicine. National security expert Fareed Zakaria has noted that the U.S./U.N. sanctions "basic effect has been to weaken civil society and strengthen the state", and that "the other effects of the sanctions has been that larger and larger parts of the economy are now controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard—the elite corps of the armed forces."

FORECLOSING DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS, LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR WAR

As countless U.S. and Israeli security officials have pointed out, diplomacy is the single most effective way to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran. This bill would be a setback to achieving a near-term diplomatic

resolution of the standoff over Iran's nuclear program, foreclosing diplomatic options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and a devastating war.

This bill would tie the President's hands, eroding the little flexibility that Congress normally allows the executive branch to conduct negotiations with Iran and allow for sanctions relief in exchange for serious, verifiable Iranian concessions. We are particularly concerned about section 217, which effectively endorses regime change. The provision would prohibit the President from lifting sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran unless Iran agrees to a host of conditions that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot reasonably be expected to agree to.

As veteran intelligence officer Paul Pillar has pointed out, requiring Iran to end efforts to "acquire or develop ballistic missiles", [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(iii)] "goes beyond any United Nations resolutions on Iran, which talk about nuclear capability of missiles, and even beyond anything ever demanded of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, for which range limits were imposed. It would be understandable if Tehran reads such language as further evidence that the United States is not interested in any negotiated agreement but instead only in regime change."

The bill even requires the President to certify that Iran does not "construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear capability" [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(ii.)]: in order to lift sanctions against Iran's Central Bank. It appears that Congress is requiring that broad indiscriminate sanctions remain in place unless Iran surrenders its nuclear program entirely, even if it is a verifiably peace program.

FCNL strongly urges members of Congress to speak out and vote against this broad, indiscriminate sanctions legislation on the House floor today.

I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Representative RON PAUL.

Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I'm still rather impressed with the obsession over a weapon that does not exist and no concern whatsoever about many nuclear weapons that are held by countries that never even joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

It's called for in the debate that Iran should end all its nuclear programs, but they're permitted to have the nuclear program under the nonproliferation treaty. And the other countries that have weapons, including the countries that hold the weapons that came from the Soviet system, it seems like that would be a much greater danger.

The investigation by either the U.N. or by our CAs has never indicated that they have ever enriched above 20 percent. And they said they won't even do it to 20 percent if the West would cooperate and sell them this material. They said, we don't need it, but we need 20 percent enrichment for nuclear isotopes, medical isotopes. So our refusal to deal with them prompts them to take up enrichment to 25 percent; 5 percent, of course, is what they're allowed to do for nuclear energies.

But this idea that we can badger people and then defy the law, what we're asking them to do, to close down their program, is you're asking them to defy international law. They agreed to this. They have a right to do this under this

treaty. And for us to come and say, well, they must quit it, I think it really is very close to an obsession on a country that is incapable of attacking us, or attacking—they don't have a history of invading their neighboring countries. The last time they were at war was with Iraq, and we bugged Iraq to go into Iran.

So I find this very distressing that the obsession continues. I find it very, very upsetting that this vote will, of course, be overwhelmingly in support of correcting the civil liberties of Syria and making Iran toe the line and give up on something that they're permitted to do. A vote for this, in my opinion, in time will show that it's just one more step to another war that we don't need.

We have not been provoked. They are not a threat to our national security, and we should not be doing this. We've been doing it too long. For the last 10, 15 years we have been just obsessed with this idea that we go to war and try to solve all the problems of the world; and at the same time, it is bankrupting us.

I strongly urge a "no" vote on this resolution.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE), who is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I want to start here by commending Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN for this sustained focus on Iran that she has had for many, many years. I also want to thank Ranking Member BERMAN for the strong pressure that he has put on the regime in Iran, as well.

Recently, we had the administration fighting hard against bipartisan sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran. But what I want to point out is that in a bipartisan way here, Congress insisted on, and today the administration touts, the impact of sanctions on Iran's economy.

Here is the point I'd like to make: we'd be in a much better position if the executive branch, both Republicans and Democrats—right now we have the problem with the Obama administration's slow-walking this; but had they been more willing to work with Congress to craft tougher sanctions earlier, we'd be in a lot better position right now. The bill's stepped-up penalties on those cooperating with Iran's energy and shipping sectors, frankly, that's the Achilles' heel that we should be aiming at.

Very importantly, this bill also includes a human rights title to go after those abusing Iran's citizens. Let's let Iranians know that we are on their side and we are going to focus on those crimes against humanity and on the brutal regime opposing them. It's a regime that beats and that imprisons—I've talked to some of these victims—and that often rapes its own people in

order to try to impose its will. It's a regime that executes political prisoners by the hundreds.

Congress is increasing the pressure. Many of us, certainly the chairman, would like to go further. Iran's centrifuges are spinning, but this progress here today deserves support.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to my friend from Florida (Mr. DEUTCH), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the author of the bill which declares Iran's energy sector a zone of proliferation.

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to recognize Chairman LEANA ROS-LEHTINEN and Ranking Member HOWARD BERMAN for their extraordinary leadership and their tireless work to bring forward a bipartisan and bicameral bill. I thank you for working with me to include several of my provisions in this legislation, including the Iran Transparency and Accountability Act, a measure that will, for the first time, require companies to disclose their business with Iran on SEC filings and for the first time create a public listing of these disclosures to clearly and definitively let the American people know which companies continue to support the illicit nuclear weapons program of Iran.

Mr. Speaker, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act significantly expands sanctions against the Iranian regime and those who, in the face of united international opposition, continue to contribute to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.

This bill sends one clear message to the entire world: if you do virtually any business in the Iranian energy sector—the financial lifeline of this regime's nuclear program—you will be subject to sanctions.

Today, the United States Congress takes U.S. sanctions policy to an unprecedented level. By sending this legislation to the President's desk, Congress can initiate an unprecedented crackdown on the Iranian regime. But our work does not end here. These punishing sanctions are a means to an end; and we cannot, for one moment, take our eye off the endgame—halting Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon.

Again, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their leadership. I urge my colleagues to support this important bill. Now is the time to stand for human rights in Iran and Syria. Now is the time. Now is the time to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the RECORD a publication from the International Civil Society Action Network, "What the Women Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark Impact of Sanctions on the Lives of Ordinary Iranians."

WHAT THE WOMEN SAY: KILLING THEM SOFTLY: THE STARK IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE LIVES OF ORDINARY IRANIANS—BRIEF 3: JULY 2012

The unprecedented, devastating and counterproductive impact of sanctions, coupled

with the on-and-off threat of war, is an ever-growing reality in the lives of ordinary Iranians. For the generation of Iranians whose childhood was punctured by nightly bombings, fear of chemical attacks, and eight years of death and destruction resulting from the Iran-Iraq war, the current state of uncertainty, prospects of hardship and unraveling of the lives they rebuilt is overwhelming.

In New York, London, Washington and Brussels the rationale for sanctions vary. Central to the case is the notion that only crippling sanctions can slow Iran's nuclear program and bring about change. A number of the sanctions also target state institutions and individuals implicated in human rights violations. Regardless of their political leanings, among western leaders, policy-makers and pundits, no one denies that economic sanctions are blunt instruments that typically harm the civilian population far more than the state. Western policy makers, however, respond that "this is the price that has to be paid"—the questions of price for what, how much, how long and by whom are left hanging.

Iranians have the answers. The earliest sanctions imposed in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution (and American hostage taking) had less direct impact on the public. But since 1995, when the Clinton Administration honed in on the oil and gas sector to the current day where the banking and financial sectors have been targeted, private enterprise and ordinary citizens are the primary and overwhelming victims. Needless to say, they are skeptical of western politicians or institutions that claim to care about the well being, human rights or aspirations of the Iranian populace.

It is not uncommon for Iranians in every walk of life to recall the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), when the Western world was complicit with Saddam's Iraq and its use of chemical weapons. With the impact of current sanctions seeping into every day life now, many Iranians consider them to be a profoundly insidious and destructive force and source of basic human rights violations, affecting a wide cross section of Iranians.

As one women's rights activist stated, "the international community's sole focus on the nuclear issue has resulted in the adoption of policies that inflict great damage on the Iranian people, civil society and women. Militarization of the environment will prompt repressive state policies and the possibility of promoting reform in Iran will diminish."

Iranians' wariness of the international community, however, has not quelled criticism of their own government. They have neither an appetite for war nor for the bellicose language of the state. They criticize the government's mishandling of the economy in recent years. They balk at the continued imposition of social restrictions. Those involved in civil rights activism including students, workers, women and leaders from ethnic groups and religious minority communities are among the first to feel the endless pressures and limitations imposed on them. Not least because the sanctions and threat of war allow the state to invoke "a state of emergency" and in so doing suppress critics and voices of dissent.

In its ongoing series of MENA region 'What the Women Say' briefs, ICAN provides a gendered analysis of the impact of sanctions, echoing the voices and experiences of Iranians, particularly women's rights activists, regarding the social, economic, political and security consequences. At a time when the United States, the European Union and others are heralding their national action plans on women, peace and security that highlight the need for women's protection in times of crisis and their participation in conflict pre-

vention and peacemaking, this brief offers the international community recommendations on limiting the immediate and long-term damage being wrought on women, Iranian society and ultimately regional security.

1. CURRENT SANCTIONS CUT DEEP AND WIDE INTO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF ORDINARY IRANIANS

Iranians know war and they know sanctions. The experiences of women, men, the elderly and the young who lived through the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war are rarely recounted today, but the long term impact is still evident. Though their plight is rarely discussed, women of child bearing age and soldiers exposed to chemical warfare still suffer from complex health problems. Similarly the thousands of men handicapped by landmines and war wounds are rarely a topic of conversation. Another long term impact has been the rise of female headed households in part due to war deaths among men.

Throughout the 1980s war years, Iranians also suffered from sanctions and lived under a strict rations policy. But it was a very different society then. Some 50 percent of Iranians lived in rural areas and were largely self sufficient through domestic agricultural production. The sanctions too were limited to key sectors pertaining to military equipment. As a result the public impact was less evident. International trade relations were sustained including with the U.S. private sector. Today only 29 percent of Iranians live in rural areas. Continued migration to urban areas has led to the expansion of cities and their peripheries. The majority of migrants eke out their living in the service industry and informal economy on the margins of cities. The sanctions regime is doing most damage to those who are already vulnerable—the urban poor. As the pressures increase, economic class and social divisions are also being exacerbated.

2010 sanctions choking insurance and shipping sectors with implications for public health: Sanctions introduced in the summer of 2010 directly targeted insurance companies that insured Iranian shipping involved in the import and export of products. Despite denials by proponents of the sanctions regime, this round of sanctions directly affected the availability of foreign-made medication and other healthcare products to Iranians including vitamins for children and pregnant women and sanitary products. The implication for serious illnesses including cancer is particularly profound. As one women's rights activists recounted, "foreign made medicine became difficult to find in 2010, and with the intensification of sanctions this trend has continued. Domestically produced drugs, which are dependent on imported ingredients, are also more expensive and difficult to find." Others echo this experience. "Many Iranians can no longer afford the high cost of cancer treatment drugs that have become hard to find," says the daughter of a female cancer patient. "Family members have to go from one hospital to another and to multiple pharmacies to find and then purchase the medicines at high costs for the treatment and life of their family members. Patients with poorer prognoses or those who cannot afford it are forgoing treatments and opting for an early death so they don't burden their families financially."

Sanctions targeting Iran's oil and gas sector were also intensified in 2010, through limiting or ending the sale of gasoline products to Iran. In anticipation, the Iranian government initiated a number of steps including ending of subsidies for gasoline, rationing gasoline and increasing domestic refining processes. As a result, the price increase has been significant, with unrationed gasoline

costing 4000 Rials per liter in 2009 and projected to increase to 8000 Rials in 2012. Free market prices for gasoline are currently at 7000 Rials per liter. Additionally the quality of the domestic product is much lower than imports, according to experts.

One significant impact of the increased use of domestically produced gasoline has been a noticeable decline in air quality, particularly in Tehran. Reports note that Tehran's air quality, which was already poor, has worsened significantly since gasoline imports were sanctioned. Even the New York Times report explained the connection between the ban on gasoline imports, the push to use domestically produced gasoline and the rapid air quality deterioration:

"According to e-mails circulated to industry experts . . . Iran's new supply of domestic gasoline may contain high levels of aromatics—more than twice the level permitted by Iranian law. Burning aromatics in car engines produces exhaust packed with high concentrations of "floating particles" or "particulates" that, added to the typical smog caused by nitrous oxides and ozone, can cause a range of health problems, from headaches and dizziness to more serious cardiac and respiratory complaints."

In the same year, Mohsen Nariman, MP from Babol said, "air pollution is on the rise at an unusual rate and it seems that one of the main causes is the substandard gasoline that is being used in Tehran." One newspaper, the Hamshahri Daily, reported that 310 persons died per day as a result of poor air quality in Tehran in the months of October and November 2011. The cause of death included increased respiratory complications, heart attacks and stroke.

Unprecedented banking sanctions targeting Iranians in all areas of life: The banking sanctions that went into effect in December 2011 have also wreaked havoc in people's lives. The Iranian Rial has almost halved in value against the US dollar and other currencies. With memories of the Iran-Iraq war still fresh for many Iranians, across Tehran and other cities, people, including shopkeepers and merchants reacted by hoarding products. Consequently the price of a wide range of goods and products including foodstuffs rose between 20-100 percent, and continues to fluctuate.

The knock-on effect is evident in all areas of life. While incomes have not increased, rents have doubled in some areas of the city. The price of bread—a staple of the Iranian diet especially for the poor—has increased by some 1500% in the past 2 years, in part due to the removal of state subsidies. The uncertainty is causing stagnation for the private sector, while some businessmen point out that companies affiliated with the state are exploiting the situation as they have access to government exchange rates. Sanctions were imposed to prevent a nuclear weapons program. Instead, as one commentator notes, the price of manure has risen.

Iranian students studying abroad have also been impacted seriously. Many are being forced to give up their education as their families can no longer afford the tuition. Some UK universities are refusing to register Iranian students because they cannot prove that they can transfer the necessary fees. But the sanctions—or the way that banks and other bodies currently interpret them—make it impossible for most Iranian students to do so.

In addition countless Iranians who have relatives living in the EU and US and those who travel for medical treatment have become entangled in the vast banking sanctions net. Thousands have personal bank accounts and savings in western banks, some dating back decades. Now they are being forced to shut down their accounts and find

themselves caught in a financial no-man's land; being forced to close existing accounts, while barred from transferring their savings to other accounts internationally or in Iran.

In effect the banking sanctions are forcing massive reliance on a cash based economy, making already vulnerable Iranians dependent on black marketeers for the transfer of funds to cover educational, health or other legitimate costs. It is also fostering the rise of informal power structures and contributing to the lack of accountability and transparency. Even the Iranian Vice President has acknowledged this development, stating, "in the framework of these sanctions we [the Iranian government] have to begin negotiations with goods traffickers near the borders and use them to buy products which are included in the sanctions."

Not surprisingly many Iranians are left questioning if the banking sanctions are intent on forcing Iran's rulers to come to the negotiating table or if Iranian society and the country's infrastructure at large are being deliberately targeted and weakened. The timing of the intensification of sanctions is particularly questionable. Iranian observers, notably civil and political activists are asking whether sanctions are in fact intent on balancing power in the region in favor of regimes that "despite their authoritarian nature accommodate the west and its security agenda in the Middle East, at a time when revolutions may threaten the existing security dynamics in the region."

In an interview with Radio Farda, Mehrdad Emadi, Economic Consultant to the EU, stressed the destructive nature of these sanctions, noting:

"This particular form of sanctioning a nation has been unprecedented in the history of the world. The only similar type of sanctions, were implemented for a short period of time, and were intended to prevent the illegal transfer of funds by Qaddafi within the framework of the activities of Libya's Central Bank. But even during that time, [the sanctions] weren't implemented in this fashion [as we see against Iran's Central Bank], . . . not all the transactions of the Libyan Central Bank were sanctioned and the sanctions focused only on the illegal transfer of funds and money laundering . . . [The Iranian sanctions] are not related to a specific sector or industry nor to business entities or specific individuals. In this framework, all monetary transactions, currency transactions and business credit accounts for imports as well as exports and for the coverage and payment of insurance, which in every country falls under the responsibilities of the Central Bank of that country, will be made illegal in Iran. Iran's Central Bank will no longer be able to carry-out these duties, because it has now been identified as a center for money laundering. In this framework, international corporations, governmental organizations, non-governmental bodies or security organizations will no longer be able to transfer funds or open credit lines for trade, using the Central Bank."

In the same interview, Hossein Mansour, a UK-based economist offered a bleaker analysis, noting, "the negative impact on Iran's economy, especially in the long run, will only be addressed with the expenditure of billions of dollars and after several generations, and will be devastating for the infrastructure of the Iranian economy."

2. WOMEN ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

Women are especially affected by the economic fall out of the sanctions. They are being pushed out of the job market and bearing the brunt of increased unemployment. Women's rights experts recognize socio-economic pattern emerging similar to those in

Iraq when sanctions were imposed. In Iraq sanctions and the ensuing poverty resulted in the withdrawal of girls from education and increases in child marriage (families were forced to marry off their young daughters to reduce the number of mouths to feed). Iranian girls are at risk of similar developments." Moreover, women's rights experts believe that the externally imposed sanctions will allow conservatives to further their regressive social agenda by relegating women back to the domestic sphere, limiting their access to education and the job market and couching it as an attempt to increase male employment.

Despite significant societal changes, Iran remains a male dominated culture, reinforced by the government's conservative ideology that considers men as the heads of households and primary breadwinners. Programs in line with this ideology, seeking to relegate women to the home as wives and mothers only have been stepped up in recent years.

Indirect and immeasurable consequences of sanctions: stifling women's education, a key engine of socio-political change: Women's rights activists are also wary of the indirect impact of sanctions—and the manipulation of the economic hardships by conservatives—on women's access to higher education. Educated women from middle and traditional working classes across rural and urban areas, among the rich and the poor, have been the primary engine of socio-political change in Iran. The demand for equal rights and equal socio-political, economic and cultural rights permeates every level of society. From the outset of the Islamic republic, the status of women has been a critical and contentious issue. In 2003, conservatives proposed the imposition of quotas to limit women's access to higher education and the measures were briefly implemented across some medical fields in the 2004 national university entrance exams. Massive outcry among students and women's rights activists forced the withdrawal of the quotas.

Conservatives have not backed down however. They continue to argue that when women are more educated than men, traditional family values are undermined, as women prefer to marry at an older age, seek similarly educated (or more educated spouses) and have higher expectations. These traditionalists also posit that women in the work force take away men's jobs. Concerns about the impact of women being more educated than men have prompted some conservative lawmakers to reinstate quotas limiting women's participation in higher education. Women and student's rights activists believe that during President Ahmadinejad's second term the quotas have been introduced with greater zeal and less accountability. They coincide with the intensification of sanctions and increased economic hardships. As the economic situation worsens, women's access to higher education, will likely endure further limitations. Even school age girls are at risk as economic pressures may force families to make choices and opt for boys' schooling. This may lead to diminished literacy rates among girls in the near future.

In effect, the marginalization of women from education and employment enables extreme conservatives to kill many birds with one stone. They prevent a high rate of women's entry into the public space (via universities). They eliminate women from the economy and job market, particularly, higher earning and more influential positions. They sustain and revive the power imbalance between women and men, as women will have fewer choices in life, limited control of resources and become (and remain) more economically dependent on men at greater rates than already exist. Ultimately they

may quash the force of women's demands—the next generation's voices—for progressive change in society at large. As one conservative member of parliament and staunch supporter of limiting women's presence in university has put it: "when women can't travel to far away cities without the permission of their husbands, their expertise has no impact on improving the situation of the country!"

There is also a significant reduction in women's share of the national budget. In the past for example, housewives received national insurance, but this has been eliminated, while the military budget has doubled for next year.

Downturns in domestic production, increases male unemployment and violence against women: There are also more insidious effects, difficult to quantify but increasingly evident. The sanctions have caused massive downturns in domestic production. The fledgling private sector is unable to import the necessary raw materials for manufacturing. The banking sanctions are causing a virtual standstill in imports and exports by legitimate businesses. Even domestic agriculture will lose its markets.

Meanwhile those with political connections are exploiting the situation often by importing cheaper Chinese products. This downward trend in domestic production will give rise to lower wages, increase unemployment among men and women and ultimately put pressure on families. As evident in other settings, women will bear the brunt of dealing with their unemployed spouses and the men of the family within the home. These new dynamics are likely to lead to increased incidences of domestic violence and family conflicts, as men's inability to live up to social expectations can lead to depression and attacks on women. Reduction in family income inevitably is forcing women to find new sources of income. Their coping strategies will likely include cutting back on their own health, wellbeing and dietary needs to provide for their dependents. As in other countries, for the most vulnerable, poverty will likely lead to risky survival strategies including child labor and sex work—in informal sectors which have expanded in Iran in recent years.

The most vulnerable are at the greatest risk: Afghan refugee women and children: Vulnerable groups, such as Afghan refugees and migrants who have been living in Iran legally and illegally as a result of decades of war and unrest in their own country, are also at greater risk. The situation is most severe for Afghan women and children refugees or Iranian women married to Afghan men and their children who do not have identity cards. The intensification of government crackdowns and forced repatriation programs, against Afghans (including their Iranian wives and children) with illegal status in Iran, has already had a negative impact on the livelihood of these groups, but as the economy has worsened the hostility they face from Iranian society and the government has also increased. Afghans have been targeted with segregation programs in public spaces and are facing increased state and other forms of violence, while their access to income and jobs has also been severely limited. Comprising a large percent of those employed in the informal sector as household help, street peddlers and in the service industry Afghan women and children are at risk of facing worsening working conditions and abuse in their place of employment.

3. INDEPENDENT CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC ACTIVISM ARE AMONG THE FIRST CASUALTIES OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Many of the men and women who founded and run Iran's civil rights movements in-

cluding human rights and women's rights activists, workers unions and journalists spent their childhood or young adulthood at war. They have tasted and experienced the impact of war and sanctions on a personal level. They are also fierce advocates of international human rights and humanitarian norms and ideals.

The public outpouring in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections prompted the state to impose heavy security measures against civic actors. But debilitating sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric of war has elevated national security concerns and further diminished the state's tolerance of dissent internally. Activists are regularly accused of working in concert with the west to destroy the Islamic Republic. The uncertainty and fear has also affected the public's receptivity to social activism. It is seen as a secondary issue compared to the urgent realities of poverty and prospect of war.

The sanctions are having a long-term negative impact on the source of societal change in Iran. The urban middle class that has historically played a central role in creating change and promoting progress in Iran are key casualties of the sanctions regime. Many civil society organizations and charities survive on the basis of voluntary activism and support. But facing economic uncertainty, many people are retreating from public voluntary work. Even the most committed have less time, as they are working longer hours and often at multiple jobs to meet their economic needs. Moreover with private enterprise in demise, more people will become dependent on the state and thus unable and fearful of engaging in civil activism. Additionally, sanctions and in particular the limitations placed on transfer of funds, has created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged in health and medical services, education efforts, support for orphans and disadvantaged women and children to carry-out their work. Many of these organizations have ceased their activities.

Sanctions are isolating Iranians from international forums: Beyond the economic impact, civil society, including the women's movement in Iran has been further isolated from their international counterparts, as a result of the sanctions. Security challenges imposed by their own government already curtail civil society's ability to attend regional and international conferences, workshops and other events. But the policies of other governments further complicate their lives. Visas that Iranian passport holders need to travel internationally, take considerable amount of time and resources. The new banking sanctions have ended the possibility of financial exchanges, while the falling price of the Rial has increased the financial burden for those activists who want to participate in conferences and training opportunities. Activists, like regular Iranians, cannot use banks to transfer funds for conference participation, hotel reservations, or to attend courses abroad. Finally, for years despite state restrictions, activists have used the internet as a critical tool for communication. But the sanctions policies have led many large hardware and software manufacturers in the United States to deny services and products to Iranians. Thus just when contact with and solidarity from the outside world are most needed, Iranians are faced with the greatest level of isolation.

4. WHAT WOMEN DO: RESILIENCE, COURAGE, VOICES OF PEACE AND A WINDOW TO THE FUTURE

Women's rights activists have never had it easy. They have fought against an assault on their legal and political rights as well as their demand for equal opportunities in the

economic, social and cultural life of the country. In 2006, when a group of women initiated the Million Signatures Campaign to demand the reform of laws that discriminate against women, they immediately faced state scrutiny and obstruction. The movement thrived however, transcending age, economic, rural, urban and even political and religious divisions to draw in a mix of volunteers. Using new and old media, improvised street theater and small group education and outreach initiatives they raised public awareness about the impact of gender based discriminatory laws and called on people to sign up and join their campaign in favor of legal changes. Despite security pressures the movement elevated issues of gender equality to the national level both politically and within wider society.

After the summer of 2009, and the mass post-election protests, women's rights activists faced increased restrictions as the space for dissent became ever more limited. With the rise of sanctions and ratcheting up of the war rhetoric, these activists are under immense pressure to become silent and conform. Countless social and political activists have been imprisoned and or forced into exile. Students—female and male have been expelled from universities because of their civil activism. Under these circumstances, with economic hardships and prospects of yet another devastating war, longterm planning and the development of sustainable programs to maintain the gains already made and push for basic rights are increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

Women's Demands: no sanctions, no war, talk it out! Despite these pressures, the Iranian women's movement has not been silenced. The call against war, in favor of a negotiated settlement, and an end to sanctions has become a primary issue for many, despite the risks they incur. They are using every opportunity to send their message to the world.

Women's rights activists now living outside of Iran draw on international platforms to echo the concerns and voices of their counterparts inside the country. Meanwhile, despite the risks, women in Iran have not been silenced either. One group, the Mothers for Peace, representing different sectors and ideologies began its activities in 2008, with the aim of preventing war and violence in the country and promoting peace regionally. They, along with other women's groups, have issued several statements opposing the possibility of war. Echoing this, in 2011, on the International Day to Fight Violence Against Women (November 25th), another group of Iranian activists issued their antiwar and violence statement, noting:

"We a group of women's rights activists in Iran, are worried about the increasing violence against women and children [that is the result] of the polarized and hostile atmosphere [and] dead-end national and international politics of tension and violence. As a result of these policies, violence against women and children infiltrates the deepest social and political and familial layers of Iranian society."

On March 8, 2012, in honor of International Women's Day, several activists involved in the One Million Signatures Campaign recorded video messages opposing war. They reject the official narratives that often pose the problems in the terms of good and evil, just and unjust, and call on all sides—including their own government—to engage in constructive dialogue rather than the rhetoric of war and threats.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE US AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Fundamentally rethink policy on Iran:

1. End the sanctions policy against Iran. Recognize that sanctions as a general rule have a poor record of influencing the behavior of states and in many situations have severely harming the population at large, particularly vulnerable groups and democratic movements. Ninety-nine percent of the current sanctions against Iran are too broad to impact the behavior of the government, instead they target the population.

2. Sanctions are not a substitute for war. They are a step closer to war. Failed sanctions will only work to strengthen the position of those advocating for another war in the region. Resolve to address the differences in a mutually respectful manner immediately.

3. Recognize that sanctions weaken society not the state. Iranian society is already witnessing the emergence of radical groups. As one women's rights activist notes, in countries of this region, including Iran, growing gaps between the rich and poor do not make governments vulnerable, rather they make the population vulnerable to increased radicalization against the West as a way of coping with humiliation. In border areas, where poverty is severe, we already witness the increasing influence of terrorist groups. If this trend continues we will be faced with a weakened Iranian society—at risk of being radicalized, with detrimental consequences for regional security in the medium and long term.

4. Recognize that sanctions undermine women's security and empowerment. The US and EU have been strong proponents of the global women, peace and security agenda with the development of priorities and action plans to ensure women's empowerment. But sanctions undermine and contravene these policies. The contradictory nature of US and EU rhetoric, policies and actions increase the Iranian public's suspicion about them, and credence to charges of hypocrisy. On negotiations with the Iranian government:

5. Engage Iran on the full range of issues, including regional security, economic issues, human rights, culture, etc. Incentives, especially those that reduce the hardship of ordinary Iranians, should be put forth to encourage a peaceful settlement to the disputes of the international community with Iran.

6. Call for the inclusion of civil society in engagement with Iran. Should Iran and the international community reach an agreement that would allow for negotiations and dialogue on a wider set of issues, civil society, including women's groups, human rights groups and peace activists, should participate.

On immediate steps for redressing the impact of sanctions on ordinary citizens:

7. Do not force an entire nation to adopt nontransparent means of financial transactions. Revise the banking sanctions so that ordinary people are not caught in them. Specifically, adopt measures to facilitate the transfer of funds by ordinary Iranian citizens and Iranians with dual nationality (EU, US, UK etc) for travel, tuition, and medical care, in the case of sale of property, inheritance or for other personal and familial purposes. Forcing Iranians to move toward a cash economy reduces transparency and fosters the growth of shadowy actors.

8. Address the adverse healthcare impact of sanctions immediately. Sanctions including limitations impacting the import of medicines, medical equipment and forced usage of substandard gasoline are affecting people's health and lives. These issues should be investigated and alleviated immediately with cooperation between the US, European and Iranian governments.

9. Help ease and enable visa applications for Iranians seeking to visit relatives.

Throughout the EU, US, Canada and Australia there are millions of citizens of Iranian descent. They have elderly parents and relatives living in Iran who visit them regularly. Visas for relatives should be expedited and offered for longer periods.

10. Encourage student visas and conference attendance. Student visas and visas for conference participation should be processed more quickly and with less financial burden on applicants.

11. Facilitate free and safe access to the internet to help foster independent civil society. Sanctions have severely limited Iranian civil society's safe access to the internet including necessary software and hardware. The international community should help provide this access and limit the imposition of sanctions in this sector.

□ 1500

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.

The Senate Banking Committee summarized this bill by saying that it "aims to prevent Iran from repatriating any of the revenue from sale of its crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and funds to run its state budget."

Spoken plainly, this bill would destroy the Iranian economy and further hurt the Iranian people that we claim to support. Iranians are already suffering under stifling sanctions as they experience rising food prices and lack of access to basic medicine. For example, the sanctions against the Iranian banking sector have greatly diminished the value of Iranian currency and have a negative effect on nearly every aspect of the lives of ordinary Iranians. The price of rent, education, and bread have all increased.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DOLD), an esteemed member of the Committee on Financial Services.

Mr. DOLD. I certainly want to thank the chairwoman for her leadership on this very important issue. I also want to thank the ranking member for his bipartisan leadership as well.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that a nuclear-armed Iran is actually the greatest threat we have to our own national security here at home. This issue is not a right versus left issue; this is a right versus wrong issue.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation is significant in its seriousness and its scope. By blacklisting virtually all of Iran's energy, banking, and transportation sectors, and specifically targeting those who enable Iran's attempted evasion of sanctions, this legislation sends a powerful signal to the Iranian regime that they should not ever question the resolve of the United States Congress to do what is necessary to confront Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions.

This legislation is the product of bipartisan efforts and hard work of many people, and I certainly appreciate Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN's and Ranking Member BERMAN's focus to try to get this passed as quickly as possible.

I'm pleased to have contributed to strengthening this sanctions package with bipartisan proposals that I introduced with Representative DEUTCH from Florida, whom we just heard from, that declare the Iranian energy sector a "zone of proliferation concern," and which will enhance the human rights portion of the bill.

I also want to note the significant contributions by Senator MARK KIRK, who has been a consistent champion and leader on the forcefulness of Iran sanctions.

I look forward to this legislation's passage today and implementation with urgency by the administration, and I look to continue to work with my colleagues in Congress on this issue until we can affirm that the Iranian regime is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

I urge adoption of this resolution and for the immediate implementation by this administration.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm very pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman who organized the Iran Working Group 7 or 8 years ago to focus congressional attention on the looming threat of a nuclear Iran, my friend from New Jersey (Mr. ANDREWS).

(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairlady from Florida and my friend from California for recognizing some grave and serious points.

First, they recognize that on the 11th of September of 2001, 19 people armed with airplane tickets and box cutters wreaked havoc on the United States of America. They recognize that a group of people with a small, improvised nuclear device could wreak havoc far worse than that on the Mall that stands in front of this building or on Times Square.

Weapons these days are not just delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles; they can be delivered by U-Haul trucks or by other means. This is the essential threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation to the United States.

The choice that we face is whether we should take concerted action to prevent that threat or whether we shouldn't. I commend the chairlady and my friend from California for choosing to unify this Congress, this country with the rest of the world with the proposition that we should present the Iranian leadership with a choice. If they decide to abandon their nuclear weapons program—which they illicitly concealed for 25 years—if they agree to live under international protocols, then the sanctions that have been imposed will be lifted and we can move forward toward peace and progress. But if they do not, they will most certainly suffer the consequences of a deteriorating economy and problems within their social structure.

We have made our choice to stand united in favor of these strong sanctions. We are presenting the Iranians

with their choice. Let us hope and pray they make a choice for peace and renewed prosperity.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.

We went to war against Iraq under the assumption they had weapons of mass destruction. Iran doesn't have weapons of mass destruction.

One of the problems with this bill is that it effectively states that sanctions on Iran's Central Bank would not be lifted unless there's a regime change. So we're bringing a whole new dimension here. It's about even more than nuclear weapons; now we're talking about regime change, because this resolution creates a new requirement for the termination of sanctions that are dependent on the cessation of the Central Bank's financing of the Revolutionary Guard, and it imposes new restrictions on the President's ability to waive sanctions.

So, what are we doing here? Setting the stage for another war. Regime change, and then upping the bar for Iran and essentially laying the groundwork for a conflict.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close.

Mr. BERMAN. I'm very pleased to yield 1 minute to a former member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my friend from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE).

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the ranking member and the chairwoman of this committee for bringing us together.

I don't like sanctions, Mr. Speaker, but I rise in strong support of this legislation. And when I say that, I understand what sanctions can do to women and children and families. In fact, I'm reminded of a debate on apartheid and sanctions in South Africa. That debate was a question of whether you undermine that nation. But we saw what happened with sanctions when we came together as a Nation to bring down the dastardly structure of apartheid.

Iran, right now today, can stop this legislation by shedding itself of all signs of building a nuclear weapon. The regime change is not by war. This bill does not suggest war. It means that voluntarily, by election, their government can change. But what I believe is most important is that we recognize, having seen that fallen woman bleeding in the street, that human rights abuses are massive. They're massive in their influence on Iraq, where they're influencing the treatment of residents of Camp Ashraf. That must stop.

So this legislation is crucial because it impacts the human rights abuses, it indicates that there is no giving on a nuclear weapon, and it gives Iran, right now today, the ability to stop this legislation and sanctions by owning up to eliminating any sign of a nuclear weaponization, treating its people with dignity, and responding to the needs of the people in Camp Ashraf.

I support the legislation enthusiastically.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.

Collectively, the provisions in this bill move the goalpost from negotiations over Iran's nuclear enrichment program to regime change. I just want to point out that the record of our country on regime change isn't all that good. Yes, we knocked out Saddam Hussein under the lie that he had weapons of mass destruction, and now al Qaeda is all over Iraq.

So, what are we about here? We're setting the stage for another war where we syphon the revenue out of this country, send it to war machines, can't meet our own needs. Since when does Iran achieve greater importance than our own country? That's what I want to know. I want somebody to explain that to me.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, could I get another indication of the time remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 4½ minutes remaining; the gentleman from Ohio has 3 minutes remaining; the gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds remaining.

Mr. BERMAN. In this case, I'm pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, a longtime member and leader on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a very active legislator on the issue before us today—that is, the effort to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon—my friend from New York (Mr. ENGEL).

Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding to me, and I rise in strong support of this legislation.

I am glad that the Senate and the House finally came together on this very, very important bill.

□ 1510

This bill has very, very strong support, as you can tell, on both sides of the aisle, and the reason it does is because Iran has proven itself to be a very, very dangerous player.

Iran is the leading supporter of terrorism in the world. Iran supplies and supports the terrorist group Hezbollah in Lebanon. And, in fact, now we see what's going on in Syria. And if it was not for Iran, Assad would not be able to continue his brutal ways and his murdering of his own people. Right now, as we talk, there are Iranian guards fighting on the side of Assad in Syria, and Iran chooses to be, and continues to be, a rogue nation.

Iran must not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. She has lied to the world consistently in talking about her purposes of the weapon, but Iran is not fooling anybody.

And so what these sanctions do is hits at Iran's oil and natural gas sectors, making it very, very difficult for them to launder money and making it very, very difficult to continue their repressive ways.

The world has spoken. This isn't only the United States. These are countries

all over the world. And unfortunately, or the blocking of some vetoes in the United Nations, there would already be sanctions in Iran.

So I urge my colleagues to support this. I think there's a reason why virtually every Member of Congress on both sides of the aisle supports it.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.

These sanctions are hurting ordinary people in Iran. I pointed out earlier, matters like the price of rent, bread—Americans can understand that—education, all of these things are increasing. And these sanctions then directly undermine Iran's civil society by giving the regime a chance to crack down even harder on internal dissent. These sanctions will ensure that those crack-downs continue.

Ordinary Iranians are struggling simply to make ends meet under this sanctions regime that already exists. They cannot afford to suspend the time necessary to participate in social movements which provide basic social services to push for democratic change in their country.

Are these the intended effects that we wish to have on the Iranian people and Iranian Americans?

And if not, passing this kind of a broad, indiscriminate sanctions bill sends the wrong message. If the sanctions imposed on Iraq are any precedent, we know that sanctions are not an effective tool in promoting or supporting domestic democracy movements.

We also know those sanctions did not prevent an unnecessary and wasteful war with Iraq. In effect, the expansion of the broad and indiscriminate sanctions, including this legislation, hurts our ability to negotiate with Iran, imposes long-term harm detrimental to the Iranian people.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I have no further requests for time.

And I'd like to just raise a couple of the issues that my friends, Mr. PAUL from Texas and Mr. KUCINICH from Ohio, have put forth in the context of opposition to this bill.

This is not the next step to war. This is the alternative to war. Iran having a nuclear weapon is unacceptable for many, many reasons:

It means the end of the nonproliferation regime;

It means countries all through that part of the world will seek their own nuclear weapons;

It raises the specter of nuclear weapons being passed on and dirty bombs being passed on to terrorists, and there is nothing in the comments of the regime that could let one relax and think they would never be the first to use those nuclear weapons.

That is unacceptable. Our alternatives are either war or finding a diplomatic resolution of their nuclear weapons program, the end of that program.

They've been found, not by the White House, not by some Vulcans in foreign policy, but by the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, over and over again, to have violated their obligations under the nonproliferation treaty to which they are a signatory. They don't ratify the additional protocols. They move ahead with enrichment plants that they don't need for a peaceful weapons program.

They do not have a right to enrich. You could argue they have a right to a nuclear energy program, but not a right to enrich. They conceal information in violation of their treaty obligations.

This is, hopefully, the final step, but if not we will have to intensify the sanctions to achieve that diplomatic program.

And Iran is not some bucolic, peace-loving state that has never done anything against its neighbors. Everyone knows that Hezbollah is a direct foreign agent of Iran that gets its funding, its training, and its sponsorship and its directions from Iran.

We know what they've done to the marines in Lebanon. We've known what they tried to do to the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. We know that in Delhi and in Bulgaria and a number of other capitals around the world, their effort to commit terrorist acts against Israeli diplomats and Israeli citizens. Their record as a state sponsor of terror is the largest and most impactful in the world.

They are pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. It is our obligation to do every measure we have to stop them from getting that, and we want to do it peacefully. This strategy that we are embarked on is an effort to find a way to do this without resorting to war, and I urge my colleagues to stand strongly behind this bill.

This is the alternative. It is the only feasible alternative. Otherwise, we are faced with two very dismal prospects: a military action or an Iran with nuclear weapons and all that means.

I urge an "aye" vote.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.

Sanctions are a form of war in this case, and it will lead to war. And remember, we're not talking about—some time ago we were talking about if Iran would have a nuclear weapon, but then the bar's been lowered to say nuclear weapon capability. And now the game's being changed to say not just nuclear weapon capability, but we want regime change as well.

I mean, if this isn't a prescription for war, then I didn't participate in the debate in this House of Representatives in October of 2002 warning this Congress, chapter and verse, that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, no role with al Qaeda in 9/11, did not have any intention or capability of attacking the United States. This is a version of that debate all over again.

I mean, come on. What are we doing here? Why is this more important than our country?

You know, our postal service is going into default tonight, a manufactured default, mind it. No debate on the House floor about this today, but an attempt to manufacture a war with Iran. What are we about?

I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

I will retain my time to close, so if Mr. KUCINICH could wrap up his part of the debate, we can conclude.

Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask how much time remains?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. KUCINICH. And how much time does the gentlelady have?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds remaining.

Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.

This legislation also requires the President to impose sanctions on those who are responsible for or are complicit in certain human rights abuses in Syria, but it fails to acknowledge that our own country and a number of our allies are actively participating and stoking the violence on the ground. Divisions and infighting within the various militias operating on the ground are already occurring. And we also read that al Qaeda's also been involved in Syria.

So, look, we have to get serious about what America's purpose is in the world. It's not to be a heavy foot. It's not to proliferate wars all over.

The first thing we have to do is take care of things here at home: jobs for all, health care for all, education for all, retirement security for all. When we can do those kinds of things, then we can pretend that we can be the policeman of the world. But until we've done that, we don't have any right to go all around the world trying to tell people how to live.

And we can settle this matter with Iran without war. We can settle it through diplomacy. Diplomacy. It would be real interesting to try it. And we ought to support any efforts of the Obama administration to use diplomacy here. Let's not use this political climate to push us into a war.

I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1520

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.

I would like to recognize the commitment, the dedication and tireless efforts of the members of our House Foreign Affairs Committee family, particularly of our staff director, Dr. Yleem Poblete, who Ranking Member BERMAN once described as driving a hard bargain. Just ask her hubby, Jason. Also, thanks to Matt Zweig and Ari Fridman.

Thanks to Chairman JOHNSON of the Senate Banking Committee and to his staff, particularly Colin McGinnis, Patrick Grant and Steve Kroll, as well as Ranking Member SHELBY and his staff.

A strong and warm thanks and big hug to my good friend Mr. BERMAN—the ranking member—and to his staff, particularly Shanna Winters, Alan Makovsky and Ed Rice, as well as minority staff director Richard Kessler.

I would like to thank Senators MENENDEZ and MARK KIRK and the critical Representatives, DEUTCH, SHERMAN and DOLD.

Let's stop Iran before it's too late. Let's pass this bill. I yield back the balance of my time.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.

Hon. LEANA ROS-LEHTINEN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Rayburn, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN: I write concerning the House-Senate negotiations on H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes. I understand the House and Senate have reached an agreement on provisions related to an Energy Information Administration report on Iran's natural gas sector.

I wanted to notify you that the Committee on Energy and Commerce will forgo action on this House-Senate compromise language so that the bill may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for consideration. This is done with the understanding that the Committee is not waiving any of its jurisdiction on this or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response confirming this understanding with respect to this provision of the House-Senate compromise to H.R. 1905, and I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during its consideration on the House floor.

Sincerely,

FRED UPTON,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.

Hon. FRED UPTON,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Rayburn, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN UPTON: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes.

I appreciate your Committee's decision to forgo action on the House-Senate compromise text so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge that your decision in this case does not represent the waiver of any of your jurisdiction over this bill or similar legislation.

I will place a copy of your letter and this reply into the Congressional Record during House consideration of the Senate amendment to H.R. 1905.

Sincerely,

LEANA ROS-LEHTINEN,
Chairman.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This bill is a critical effort to tighten sanctions against the Tehran regime, and to increase pressure to force the government to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a grave threat to the United States, to regional stability in the

Middle East, and to the entire international community. Both President Obama and the United States Congress have unequivocally stated that Iran must not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.

On his visit to the Middle East this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated that “sanctions are having a serious impact in terms of the economy in Iran.” Iran is now struggling to conduct international trade, losing markets and trading partners. Its currency has lost over half of its value.

Meanwhile, the administration continues to expand sanctions against Tehran. Earlier this week, President Obama signed an executive order to extend sanctions to anyone, using any method of payment, who purchases Iranian crude oil—preventing Iran from circumventing sanctions by using bartering and other unconventional payment options. It also expanded sanctions on buyers of Iranian petrochemical products, and authorized penalties for entities seeking to evade U.S. sanctions. Also this week, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq for providing financial services to Iranian banks.

Today, Congress is acting to further tighten the economic noose on the Iranian regime. The bill under consideration today, H.R. 1905, strengthens and expands existing sanctions, banning any commercial activities with Iran’s oil and natural gas sector, including helping Iran ship its oil under the flag of another nation. This bill increases sanctions targeting entities involved with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and sanctions human rights offenders.

When coupled with existing sanctions, today’s bill represents the strongest-ever effort to financially isolate Iran. This is critical, because we must persuade the Tehran government to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. I strongly support utilizing our entire diplomatic and economic arsenal to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.

Today’s bill is a critical step towards increasing pressure on the Iranian government. I urge my colleagues to join me in strongly supporting this legislation.

Mr. REED. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reaffirm my support for sanctions to be placed upon Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei are once again stressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within Iran’s borders and we must take swift and strong actions against these measures.

Iran is not just a threat to the United States, but to all free countries around the globe. As a country that harbors terrorists, foreign leaders must stay vigilant and recognize Iran’s practices as a national security concern.

Lastly, we must stand up against the human rights abuses the Iranian regime is supporting. Its citizens have continually been sheltered from outside information and ideas due to strict governmental control. We need to inform the regime that the Iranian citizens deserve the basic human rights as laid out by the United Nations. I am proud to support H.R. 1905 and I encourage the President to sign this into law promptly.

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This bipartisan legislation represents the strongest

set of sanctions to isolate any country in the world during peacetime.

It is imperative that our nation takes all steps necessary to isolate Iran, force them to end their dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons, and secure that the regime in Teheran will no longer be a threat to peace and prosperity in the Middle East.

Once this legislation is passed and signed into law, virtually all of Iran’s energy, financial, and transportation sectors would be subject to U.S. sanctions. Companies conducting business in these industries would face the possibility of losing access to U.S. markets.

I also applaud the inclusion of sanctions against human rights abusers in Iran and Syria in this legislation. The deplorable actions by the political and military leaders in Iran and Syria against their own people must come to an immediate halt and deserve global condemnation.

Important allies, such as the European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and Israel, have joined the American people in enacting sanctions against Iran.

It is important that this Chamber say with a strong, unified voice that we stand with Israel during these difficult times.

As co-chair of the Democratic Israel Working Group, I call on Members from both sides of the aisle to vote in support of this bipartisan resolution.

I would also like to take a moment to thank the President for his leadership on sanctions on Iran. Yesterday, President Obama signed an Executive Order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors, as well as sanctions against those who are providing material support to the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran. These measures will help strengthen the existing sanctions regime and bring Iran that much closer to ending its heedless quest for nuclear weapons.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the House amendment to the previous Senate amendment to H.R. 1905. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, former President George H.W. Bush said that Iran was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and exporting terror. A decade later, Iran’s global threat is greater than ever.

We are currently embroiled in a standoff with Iran over its pursuit of nuclear capability. We find ourselves on the brink of conflict over potential Iranian armed interference with oil and other shipments through the Strait of Hormuz and its persistent threats against Israel. Even prior to 9–11, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, was responsible for more American deaths around the world than any other terrorist organization. Since 2001, Iran has embarked on more direct efforts to harm American interests as evidenced by last year’s foiled Iranian-backed assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

The current state of Iranian sanctions clearly has not worked to reduce Tehran’s threat to global peace. That’s why we need the enhanced approach this legislation will take in countering efforts by Iran to evade the impact of international sanctions. H.R. 1905 as amended tightens reporting on countries violating sanctions on these countries and

strengthens measures against those who would aid and abet these disturbers of global peace.

It also effectively blacklists Iran’s energy sector and anyone doing business with it. By preventing Iran from repatriating the proceeds from its oil sales, this rogue government will be deprived of 80 percent of its hard currency earning and half of the funds used to support its national budget.

Iran has used many tricks to subvert current sanctions—from oil for gold swaps to selling energy bonds to other trading and bartering schemes. They have been successful because there are governments who care more for making profit from doing business in Iran than in preventing threats to world peace. International efforts to rein in the nuclear ambitions of Iran have been stymied particularly by China.

Despite expressing formal support for United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran since 2005, China has stepped in where other nations have curtailed trade with Iran. China’s Bank of Kunlun and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq have facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars for Iranian banks already under sanctions. Stronger sanctions will make such unsavory alliances more difficult. This is why the reformulated bill we consider today is so vital in eliminating to the extent possible all avenues for Iran’s allies to play enabler to its nuclear ambitions and to its patronage of terrorist operations.

I want to congratulate House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Chairman TIM JOHNSON and other members for their hard work in crafting a bipartisan, bicameral bill that works.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 750.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the yeas have it.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

JOB PROTECTION AND RECESSION PREVENTION ACT OF 2012

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 747, I call up the bill (H.R. 8) to extend certain tax relief provisions enacted in 2001 and 2003, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 747, the bill is considered read.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 8

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Job Protection and Recession Prevention Act of 2012”.