

By all accounts, this peacekeeping policy in Bosnia has been an unqualified success. The Dayton Peace Accord is working; NATO is working; the killing has stopped; the genocide, stopped; ethnic cleansing and rapes, stopped; economic development is taking root; democratic institutions are being created; and the children of Bosnia are laughing and playing outside again, all because of our involvement. This, in essence, is the best of America.

Our bipartisan delegation drafted a statement of our findings which I would like to insert into the RECORD at the appropriate time.

Now is not the time to turn Bosnia over to the hard-liners again; and I, for one, do not intend to surrender the children on the streets of Sarajevo to the snipers again. I urge my colleagues to support the mission and the people of Bosnia. Support our troops in Bosnia. Oppose this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, the document referred to earlier is submitted, as follows:

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

(By Representative Roger Wicker, Representative Saxby Chambliss, Lindsey Graham, Representative Gil Gutknecht, Representative Ron Kind, Representative Dennis Kucinich)

1. The delegation wishes to acknowledge the impressive professionalism and dedication of U.S. service personnel serving on the ground in Bosnia and supporting Operation Joint Guard from deployment sites in Hungary and Italy. It was clear that U.S. military forces are performing their mission in an exemplary fashion. They are being asked to do more with less and are responding admirably. The American people can be proud of the way their armed forces—active duty, reserve, and national guard components—have risen to the challenge of ensuring a peaceful, secure, and stable environment in Bosnia. All Americans owe these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines a debt of gratitude.

2. We have been informed that U.S. force levels in Bosnia are likely to be reduced from the current 8,500 to 6,900. We are concerned that a lower troop level may lead to increased risk, given the potential for violence directed against or involving U.S. troops as they execute their missions. We believe that an appropriate level of forces in Bosnia must be based on a sound military assessment of the risks and not on any political considerations. Force protection must be a top priority. Increasing the risk to U.S. forces is not an acceptable policy option. At a minimum, we recommend that U.S. force levels not be reduced until after the September 1998 elections are held and a review of the security situation is conducted. We feel that progress in Bosnia should be judged by the achievement of specific milestones and that any troop reduction should be tied to the achievement of these milestones.

3. Prior to the elections in December 1997, which brought to power more moderate leadership within the Republika Srpska, hard-line Bosnian Serbs in power demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with the terms of the Dayton Agreement. As a result, the overwhelming bulk of Western economic aid has flowed to the Muslim-Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The recently elected moderate government within the Republika Srpska lacks the financial resources to function effectively, raising concerns about the government's political viability. We were advised by our military and

diplomatic leadership that \$5 million in U.S. assistance to the new Republika Srpska government is essential, as part of a \$20 to 30 million dollar international assistance package, to demonstrate our commitment to the long-term viability of the new government until it begins generating sufficient revenues on its own. We strongly support appropriation of this \$5 million in assistance. Compared to the \$2 to 3 billion dollars invested annually in support of the military operation, \$5 million is a relatively small price to pay to ensure the stability of the new, reform-minded Republika Srpska government. However, we also believe that any U.S. assistance of this nature should not be funded from Department of Defense accounts.

4. Among the more pressing needs within Bosnia is the establishment of an economic infrastructure that will give the Bosnian people sense of hope and the prospect of a brighter economic future. Without a productive economy, we believe there is little chance for a lasting peace.

5. The need for a continued American troop presence on the ground in Bosnia was stressed by U.S. military commanders, political officials, diplomats, and the Bosnian people with whom we met. There is a widespread conviction that U.S. troops are essential to preventing a resumption of war. Having seen the situation in Bosnia first hand, it is clear to us that the presence of American forces is necessary.

6. The September 1998 Bosnian elections will be a watershed in determining whether Bosnia moves forward or backward. Until then, we believe that the United States should actively continue to support the process of Dayton implementation. Given the effort already expended, it would be foolish to change our political, diplomatic, or military policy in Bosnia before the September elections have taken place. However, we do not believe that the U.S. commitment can be open-ended. SFOR will provide important support to the Office of the High Representative in its efforts to create the climate for a fair election. Notwithstanding our observations of the role in peace being played by U.S. troops, we are concerned about the annual exercise of funding our peacekeeping operations in Bosnia by means of supplemental appropriations. We encourage the Administration to pursue means by which such contingencies can, at least to some degree, be funded other than at the cost of other important national priorities.

7. We are convinced the United States has a vital interest in the stability of Central Europe. The United States is the undisputed leader of the Free World. This role carries with it responsibilities, and among these is participating in efforts to ensure Europe's stability. However, it is our desire that the future of Bosnia ultimately be determined by the Bosnian people themselves.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL).

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I rise in strong support of this resolution, and I compliment the gentleman from California for bringing it to this floor.

This is an immensely important constitutional issue and one that we should pay close attention to and obviously support. I would like this same principle, of course, to apply across the board, especially when it comes to bombing foreign countries, like Iraq, because we should not be involved in war efforts without the consent of the Congress.

The Constitution is very, very clear on this. Unfortunately, policy has drifted away from a noninterventionist constitutional approach. Just in the last 2 days we had five resolutions implying that we have the economic strength, we have the military power and the wisdom to tell other people what to do.

Usually it starts just with a little bit of advice that leads next to then sending troops in to follow up with the advice that we are giving. So I think this is very, very important, to get this out on the table, debate this, and for Congress to reassume the responsibility that they have given to an imperial presidency.

Prior to World War II there were always debates in the House of Representatives any time we wanted to use military force. Whether it was 150 years ago, when we decided to spread our borders southward towards Mexico, or whether 100 years ago when we decided to do something in Cuba, it came here. They had the debates, they had the arguments, but they came to the floor and debated this.

Today, ever since World War II, we have reneged on that responsibility. We have turned it over to the President and allowed him to be involved. We have given him words of encouragement that implies that we support his position. We do so often and, as far as I am concerned, too carelessly. But when we do this, the President then assumes this responsibility; and, unfortunately, since World War II, it has not even been for national security reasons.

The Persian Gulf War was fought with the assumption that the administration got the authority from the United Nations. If we are to express ourselves and to defend our national sovereignty, we should have the Congress vote positive on this resolution because it is so critical.

Today, we have been overextended. Our military is not as strong as some people believe. Our economy is probably not nearly as strong as some believe. We have troops that could be attacked in Korea. We have the potentiality of bombing Baghdad at the same time we have troops in harm's way in Bosnia. So we have spread ourselves too thinly, and we are vulnerable.

We have a responsibility here. The Congress has a responsibility to the American people. We are here to defend the national sovereignty and the protection of the United States. Troops in Bosnia threatens our national security and threatens the lives of the American citizen who is protecting or fighting in this region. So it is up to us to assume this responsibility.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. TAYLOR).

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I wish to tell my friend from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) that, had this vote been taken 1 year ago today, I would have voted with him.